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The past several years have witnessed a burst of scholarship at the 
intersection of national security and administrative law.  Many supporters of 
this approach endorse a heightened, “super-strong” brand of Chevron 
deference to presidential decisionmaking during times of emergency.  
Believing that the Executive’s comparative advantage in expertise, access to 
information, and accountability warrant minimal judicial scrutiny, these 
Chevron-backers advance an Executive-centric view of national security 
powers.  Other scholars, by contrast, dispute Chevron’s relevance to national 
security.  These Chevron-detractors argue for an interventionist judiciary in 
national security matters.  Both camps criticize the Supreme Court’s scaling of 
deference to the Executive after 9/11: Chevron-backers argue that the Court 
failed to accord sufficient deference to the President, while Chevron-detractors 
argue that the Court failed to clarify the scope of individual liberties.  
However, neither side appreciates the role that Justice Jackson’s seminal 
Youngstown concurrence has played in the Court’s resolution of recent 
national security cases. Youngstown makes congressional legislation – not 
Executive power or individual rights – the central judicial concern in cases 
pitting individual liberty against Executive power.  The post-9/11 Supreme 
Court, following Justice Jackson, has used judicial review to catalyze 
congressional action by remanding to Congress policy questions lacking joint 
political branch support.  This dual-branch theory of governance preserves a 
critical rule-of-law basis for judicial review of national security 
decisionmaking that Chevron’s backers and its detractors overlook.   
INTRODUCTION 
The past several years have witnessed a burst of scholarship at the 
intersection of administrative law and national security.1  Many supporters of 
 
1 See Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Chevronizing Foreign Relations Law, 116 
YALE L.J. 1170, 1173 (2007) (“[C]ourts should generally draw on established principles of 
administrative law to permit executive interpretations of ambiguous statutory terms to 
overcome the international relations doctrines.”); Cass R. Sunstein, Administrative Law 
Goes to War, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2663, 2672 (2005) (“In war no less than in peace, the 
inquiry into presidential authority can be organized and disciplined if it is undertaken with 
close reference to standard principles of administrative law.”); Adrian Vermeule, Our 
Schmittian Administrative Law, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1095, 1101 (2009) (recognizing the 
development of “theories urging that emergency action by the executive should be subjected 
to ordinary administrative law, rather than remaining as a separate sphere governed at most 
by military rules and practices”); John Yoo, Administration of War, 58 DUKE L.J. 2277, 
2281 (2009) (“Administrative law scholarship has generally passed over the study of the 
military in favor of the domestic agencies.  This is an oversight, because the armed forces 
are arguably the most important of all of the elements of the administrative state.”); see also 
Curtis A. Bradley, Chevron Deference and Foreign Affairs, 86 VA. L. REV. 649, 651 (2000) 
(“Much can be gained, I argue, by considering foreign affairs law from the perspective of 
the Chevron doctrine in administrative law.”); Julian Ku & John Yoo, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld: 
The Functional Case for Foreign Affairs Deference to the Executive Branch, 23 CONST. 
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an administrative law approach to national security argue that courts should 
apply Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. to the 
national security context.2  Chevron requires judicial deference to reasonable 
Executive Branch interpretations of ambiguous statutory language,3 and 
Chevron-backers argue that times of emergency call for “super-strong” 
Chevron deference based on a combination of the Executive’s institutional 
expertise and the President’s independent constitutional commander-in-chief 
powers.4  While the post-9/11 period has produced “decisions that can well be 
understood as administrative law rulings,”5 the Supreme Court has not 
endorsed a wholesale theory of deference (or non-deference) where 
presidential power is concerned.  Rather than apply Chevron,6 the Court has 
invoked Justice Jackson’s seminal concurrence in Youngstown Sheet & Tube 
Co. v. Sawyer7 as the critical framework for scaling deference to the 
Executive’s preferred security policies.   
While Chevron’s advocates have frequently promoted the application of 
broad deference rules even in the absence of congressional legislation,8 
 
COMMENT. 179, 195-97 (2006) (arguing that the Supreme Court should have applied 
Chevron deference to the President’s interpretations of statutes and treaties in Hamdan).   
2 Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
3 Id. at 842-43.   
4 See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 1, at 2671 (arguing that, after 9/11, the President should 
receive “the kind of super-strong deference that derives from the combination of Chevron 
with what are plausibly taken to be his constitutional responsibilities”). 
5 STEPHEN G. BREYER, RICHARD B. STEWART, CASS R. SUNSTEIN & ADRIAN VERMEULE, 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY 29 (6th ed. 2006); see also Hamdi v. 
Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 529-34 (2004) (applying Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 
(1976), to determine the extent of due process rights afforded to a U.S. citizen “enemy 
combatant”); cf. id., 542 U.S. at 575 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (chiding the Hamdi plurality for 
resolving the due process question by resort to “a case involving . . . the withdrawal of 
disability benefits!”); Corrected Brief for Respondent Addressing Pending Preliminary 
Motions at 51, Bismullah v. Gates, 514 F.3d 1291 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (Nos. 06-1197, 06-1397) 
(arguing that review under the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 “evokes this Court’s 
familiar function of reviewing a final administrative decision based upon the record before 
the agency”). 
6 See Vermeule, supra note 1, at 1128-29 (finding it “significant” that courts deciding 
national security cases after 9/11 “often do not so much as advert to Chevron”); id. at 1128 
(stating that the Supreme Court decided “issues of statutory authorization (in Hamdi) and 
statutory prohibition (in Hamdan) without offering direct instruction on the relevance of 
Chevron”). 
7 343 U.S. 579 (1952).   
8 Posner & Sunstein, supra note 1, at 1199 (calling for deference even when “there is no 
interpretation of a statutory term but simply a policy judgment by the executive”); id. at 
1205 (“[I]n the domain of foreign relations, the approach signaled in Chevron should apply 
even if the executive is not exercising delegated authority to make rules or conduct 
adjudications.”); id. at 1177 (arguing that courts should “play a smaller role . . . in 
interpreting statutes that touch on foreign relations”). 
  
1920 BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 92:1917 
 
scholars at the opposite end of the spectrum question Chevron’s application to 
the national security context.9  According to these Chevron-detractors, even 
when national security policies are the product of joint political branch 
decisionmaking, the Supreme Court should “say what the law is”10 and 
override the collective wisdom of the political branches when necessary.11  
While Chevron-backers and Chevron-detractors provide important insights into 
the role of administrative law as a source of decisionmaking in national 
security cases, both camps ignore Youngstown at their peril.12 
Under Jackson’s framework in Youngstown, presidential powers are at their 
apogee when backed by congressional authorization and their “lowest ebb” 
when contrary to congressional will.13  In between these two extremes are 
“zone of twilight” cases in which the President lacks a clear constitutional 
foundation or a basis in congressional authorization.14  The post-9/11 
decisions, following Youngstown, have focused less on the issue of deference 
as such and more on the shared responsibility of the political branches to create 
legislative schemes regarding national security policy.15  Where Congress has 
 
9 See Martin S. Flaherty, Judicial Foreign Relations Authority After 9/11, 56 N.Y.L. SCH. 
L. REV. 119, 133, 138 (2011) (questioning the appropriateness of analogizing Chevron to 
the foreign affairs context); Deborah N. Pearlstein, After Deference: Formalizing the 
Judicial Power for Foreign Relations Law, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 783, 836-42 (2011) 
(questioning the role of Chevron deference in foreign affairs and arguing for a strong 
judicial role in deciding rights claims raised in national security cases). 
10 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). 
11 See Flaherty, supra note 9, at 122 (arguing that the post-9/11 Court did not “go far 
enough . . . to afford the 9/11 judgments the security they need to prevent a rollback and still 
less to permit the judiciary to assume its intended role in a globalized age”); Jenny S. 
Martinez, Process and Substance in the “War on Terror,” 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1013, 1029, 
1032, 1092 (2008) (positing that the recent national security decisions prior to Boumediene 
“resulted in a great deal of process, and not much justice” and that “so little seems to have 
been decided” after 9/11 because the Court “left the final, substantive outcome of the cases 
at bar uncertain”); see also Muneer I. Ahmad, Resisting Guantánamo: Rights at the Brink of 
Dehumanization, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 1683, 1684 (2009) (questioning the premise that the 
Boumediene decision was “a rebuke to the Executive’s claims of outsized authority, and . . . 
a reassertion of the supremacy of law”); David D. Cole, Rights over Borders: Transnational 
Constitutionalism and Guantanamo Bay, 7 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 47, 61 (2008) (arguing that 
the protection of human rights “requires . . . the robust intervention of unelected courts”); 
Owen Fiss, The War Against Terrorism and the Rule of Law, 26 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 
235, 235 (2006) (faulting the Supreme Court “for doing less than it should have” in 
resolving constitutional questions of individual liberty). 
12 With the exception of the brief discussion of Justice Black’s majority opinion in 
Youngstown discussed infra notes 35-38, this Article uses “Jackson’s framework” and 
“Youngstown” or “Youngstown framework” interchangeably.  
13 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637-38 (1952) (Jackson, J., 
concurring). 
14 Id. at 637. 
15 See infra Part III.B. 
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responded by providing the Executive with a delegation concerning a 
particular security need, courts have typically construed those statutes 
deferentially.16  However, where Congress has remained silent, courts have 
generally invoked Youngstown to catalyze greater inter-branch dialogue,17 
remanding issues to the political branches for additional legislative input.  This 
process-oriented approach captures the Court’s recent decisions more 
accurately than its apparent commitment to deference or non-deference where 
Executive power is concerned.  By applying Youngstown, the Court has tamed 
Chevron’s imperialistic aspirations, using judicial intervention as a way of 
resetting the proper institutional balance between Congress and the Executive.    
The post-9/11 decisions, understood through the lens of Youngstown, 
demonstrate congruities between national security cases and non-emergency 
administrative law rulings.  In both domains, the Supreme Court has 
underscored the significance of congressional delegations for the scaling of 
judicial deference to the Executive Branch.  By exploring cases in both the 
domestic and national security contexts, this Article indicates the importance 
of legislative authorization as a predicate for deference across different 
substantive arenas.  By highlighting the intersection of “ordinary” 
administrative law decisions on the one hand, and recent national security 
cases on the other, it calls attention to an emerging middle-ground solution 
courts have used in national security cases that is consistent with, if not 
anchored squarely within, foundational principles of administrative law. 
This Article proceeds in three Parts.  Part I frames the discussion by 
comparing and contrasting Youngstown and Chevron and detailing the 
argument, made by a growing chorus of scholarly voices, that Chevron should 
be applied directly, or by analogy, to the national security context.  It then 
contrasts the Chevron-in-national-security argument with Chevron’s more 
recent domestic law interpretations.  As this Part indicates, those who favor 
applying Chevron to national security often rely on an interpretation of the 
doctrine that is largely out of step with its more recent domestic law 
interpretations. 
Part II underscores why Youngstown has been, and continues to be, a 
foundational case of national security, reflected most recently in the Supreme 
Court’s post-9/11 national security decisions.  Indeed, as this Part notes, four 
Supreme Court cases decided between Rasul v. Bush18 and Boumediene v. 
Bush19 evidence Youngstown’s continued vitality.  These cases underscore the 
importance of dual-branch approaches to national security questions – rejecting 
complete deference to the Executive on the one hand or judicial activism on 
the other.  Where Congress has delegated authority to the President to act, the 
Court has accorded deference to the political branches.  However, where 
 
16 See infra notes 232-36, 265-72 and accompanying text. 
17 See infra notes 256-64 and accompanying text. 
18 542 U.S. 466 (2004). 
19 553 U.S. 723 (2008). 
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national security legislation has been lacking, the Court has refused to grant the 
Executive anything close to the kind of deference called for by Chevron-
backers. 
Part III largely defends the post-9/11 Court’s approach as a proper 
application of both Youngstown and Chevron.  While Chevron-backers such as 
Eric Posner and Cass Sunstein would resolve ambiguity about the existence of 
a delegation through a simpler, cleaner, and arguably more reliable test that 
expands executive power through a broad interpretation of Chevron deference, 
their theory oversimplifies and, more seriously, eliminates a core delegation 
requirement within administrative law that accords with Chevron’s doctrinal 
foundation, a point that is revealed in recent emergency and non-emergency 
decisions.  At the same time, the argument by Chevron’s critics overstates the 
role of courts in overruling policy decisions reached through joint political 
branch deliberation.  Rather than adhere to a single-branch theory of 
governance based purely in Executive prerogative or judicial activism, the 
post-9/11 decisions employ Youngstown to promote an interactive role for the 
political branches that supplies an important rule-of-law basis for judicial 
review of national security law. 
I. CHEVRON V. YOUNGSTOWN 
The Constitution says very little about the political branches’ respective 
national security powers.20  Article II makes the President Commander in 
Chief of the Armed Forces21 and vests him with an indefinite “executive 
Power”22 but specifies few additional enumerated powers in foreign affairs.23 
Congress has the power “to declare War,”24 to “raise and support Armies,”25 
and the power of the purse.26  Beyond this, the precise boundaries and balance 
 
20 Patricia L. Bellia, Executive Power in Youngstown’s Shadows, 19 CONST. COMMENT. 
87, 90 (2002) (observing that national security is an arena in which “the Constitution says 
little, controversies are frequent, judicial resolutions are few, and the stakes are high”). 
21 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.  
22 Id. § 1, cl. 1.  Article II also vests the President with the power to make treaties with 
the consent of two-thirds of the Senate and to appoint and receive ambassadors and other 
public ministers.  Id. § 2, cl. 2.  
23 See Harold Hongju Koh, Why the President (Almost) Always Wins in Foreign Affairs: 
Lessons of the Iran-Contra Affair, 97 YALE L.J. 1255, 1282 (1988) (observing that the 
Constitution’s text vests few foreign affairs powers in the president).  
24
 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11. 
25 Id. cl. 12. 
26 Id.  Congress also has the power to “define and punish . . . Offences against the Law of 
Nations,” id. cl. 10, “[t]o make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and 
naval Forces,” id. cl. 14, and to “provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of 
the United States,” id. cl. 1.  Furthermore, Congress has the power to “regulate Commerce 
with foreign nations.”  Id. cl. 3.  The Constitution further authorizes Congress to “define and 
punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas,” as well as “make Rules 
concerning Captures on Land and Water.”  Id. cl. 10.  Finally, the Constitution provides for 
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of power between the Congress and the President are left largely undefined,27 
eliminating any “really useful and unambiguous authority applicable to 
concrete problems of executive power as they actually present themselves.”28 
Hence, courts and commentators have often looked beyond the text29 for 
institutionally grounded, dual-branch solutions to questions regarding 
government power where national security is concerned.30 Youngstown and 
Chevron each provide a process-oriented framework to ground presidential 
“authorities that Congress has expressly or impliedly delegated to him by 
statute.”31   
A. Two Frameworks for National Security 
While many national security scholars have routinely praised Youngstown as 
the gold standard of emergency law jurisprudence,32 others have heralded 
Chevron as a highly influential ruling33 that has application to the national 
 
the suspension of habeas corpus “when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety 
may require it.”  Id. § 9, cl. 2. 
27 See Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law as Federal 
Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARV. L. REV. 815, 863 (1997) (“In 
contrast to the Commerce Clause, no clause in the Constitution provides the federal 
government with a general ‘foreign relations’ power.”); Cass R. Sunstein, Minimalism at 
War, 2004 SUP. CT. REV. 47, 66-68. 
28 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 634 (1952) (Jackson, J., 
concurring). 
29 Saikrishna B. Prakash & Michael D. Ramsey, The Executive Power over Foreign 
Affairs, 111 YALE L.J. 231, 236-37 (2001) (observing that scholars “who agree on little 
else” often look beyond the Constitution’s text in grounding the government’s national 
security powers); see also id. at 235 (commenting on the “repeated denial” by foreign affairs 
scholars “that the Constitution’s text can provide much meaningful guidance in allocating 
foreign affairs powers”). 
30 Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Between Civil Libertarianism and Executive 
Unilateralism: An Institutional Process Approach to Rights During Wartime, 5 
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 1, 5 (2004) (stating that in cases pitting liberty against security 
“the courts have developed a process-based, institutionally-oriented (as opposed to rights-
oriented) framework for examining the legality of governmental action in extreme security 
contexts”).  
31 See Koh, supra note 23, at 1263 & n.32. 
32 Neal Kumar Katyal, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld: The Legal Academy Goes to Practice, 120 
HARV. L. REV. 65, 99 (2006) (“Youngstown’s framework has become the gold standard . . . 
.”); see also id. at 99 (“Both then-Judge Roberts and then-Judge Alito professed extreme 
reverence for the [Youngstown] framework at their confirmation hearings.”); Ku & Yoo, 
supra note 1, at 179 (acknowledging “the long-term significance” of Youngstown); Sanford 
Levinson, Why the Canon Should Be Expanded to Include the Insular Cases and the Saga of 
American Expansionism, 17 CONST. COMMENT. 241, 242 n.2 (2000) (deeming Jackson’s 
Youngstown concurrence “the greatest single opinion ever written by a Supreme Court 
justice”).     
33 See BREYER, STEWART, SUNSTEIN & VERMEULE, supra note 5, at 247 (suggesting that 
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security context.34  Yet, depending on one’s interpretations of these respective 
frameworks, the selection of Chevron or Youngstown can have a dramatic 
effect upon the scaling of judicial deference to the Executive. 
1. The Youngstown Framework 
Youngstown involved an executive order by President Truman directing the 
Secretary of Commerce to take control of the steel industry to aid the country’s 
defense needs in the Korean War after a threatened strike by the steelworkers’ 
union.35  Steel mill owners challenged the executive order, and the Supreme 
Court invalidated it as an arrogation of executive power without proper 
congressional authorization.36  Justice Black’s majority opinion reasoned that 
presidential emergency powers must derive “from an act of Congress or from 
the Constitution itself.”37  Finding that there was no statute that explicitly or 
implicitly authorized the President’s seizure of the mills, nor an inherent 
Article II power to take such action, the Court struck down the order.38 
All of the Justices joining Justice Black’s majority opinion wrote separate 
concurrences, and of those concurrences Justice Jackson’s has emerged as the 
enduring framework outlining the proper relationship among the three 
branches during times of national emergency.39  Jackson, like Black, viewed 
the executive order as contrary to Congress’s intention – an example of the 
 
Chevron is “the most influential case in the history of American public law”).  Until 
recently, Chevron was thought to be the single most-cited decision in all of American law, 
though its status as most-cited case may have been eclipsed, or may soon be overtaken, by 
the sea change in civil procedure doctrine wrought by Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 
U.S. 544 (2007), and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009).  For more discussion of 
Chevron’s impact, see Thomas W. Merrill, The Story of Chevron: The Making of an 
Accidental Landmark, in ADMINISTRATIVE LAW STORIES 399, 399 (Peter L. Strauss ed., 
2006) (stating that Chevron is “the most frequently cited case in administrative law” and, at 
the time of publication, was the most frequently cited case of all behind Erie Railroad Co. v 
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938)); Thomas W. Merrill, The Story of Chevron USA, Inc. v. 
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.: Sometimes Great Cases Are Made Not Born, in 
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION STORIES 164, 165 n.2 (William N. Eskridge, Jr., Philip P. 
Frickey & Elizabeth Garrett eds., 2011) (noting that as of June 2009, Chevron had “been 
cited in 9,888 federal cases, which exceeds the citation count for other leading cases 
discussing aspects of the standard of review of agency action”); Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron 
Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187, 189-90 (2006) (“Chevron has had a fundamental impact on 
areas as disparate as taxation, labor law, environmental protection, immigration, food and 
drug regulation, and highway safety.”). 
34 See generally supra note 1; infra notes 63-104 and accompanying text. 
35 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 582 (1952). 
36 Id. at 585-89. 
37 Id. at 585. 
38 Id. at 585-89. 
39 Id. at 635-38 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
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President acting at the lowest ebb of his power40 – and he articulated a 
tripartite framework for judicial review of Executive Branch activity during 
times of national emergency that reinforces the textualist and delegation-based 
rationales in Justice Black’s majority opinion.  Jackson divided presidential 
emergency action into three categories.  First, “[w]hen the President acts 
pursuant to an express or implied authorization of Congress, his authority is at 
its maximum, for it includes all that he possesses in his own right plus all that 
Congress can delegate.”41  Such action under Category One, taken with 
consent of Congress, “would be supported by the strongest of presumptions” 
when subject to judicial review.42  Next, Jackson discussed presidential action 
“in [the] absence of either a congressional grant or denial of authority.”43  In 
these cases falling under Category Two, the President, relying exclusively 
“upon his own independent powers,” acts within “a zone of twilight in which 
he and Congress may have concurrent authority, or in which its distribution is 
uncertain.”44  When this type of presidential action is challenged, “any actual 
test of power is likely to depend on the imperatives of events and 
contemporary imponderables rather than on abstract theories of law.”45  
Finally, under Category Three, “[w]hen the President takes measures 
incompatible with the expressed or implied will of Congress, his power is at its 
lowest ebb, for then he can rely only upon his own constitutional powers minus 
any constitutional powers of Congress over the matter.”46  Courts entertaining 
challenges to such “preclusive” presidential action “must . . . scrutinize[] such 
presidential action with caution, for what is at stake is the equilibrium 
established by our constitutional system.”47 
2. The Chevron Framework 
While Youngstown enjoys a storied place as a definitive framework for 
resolving complex cases involving the clash between individual liberty and 
executive power,48 commentators have recently turned to Chevron as the 
proper starting point “for understanding and controlling deference in what is an 
otherwise very amorphous area.”49  Chevron was an environmental law case in 
which the Court held that industrial plants would be allowed to consolidate 
their various pollution-generating entities by upholding the EPA’s 
 
40 Id. at 640. 
41 Id. at 635.  
42 Id. at 637. 
43 Id. 
44 Id. 
45 Id. 
46 Id. 
47 See id. at 638. 
48 See supra note 32 and accompanying text. 
49 Bradley, supra note 1, at 674; see also Ku & Yoo, supra note 1; Posner & Sunstein, 
supra note 1; Sunstein, supra note 1; Yoo, supra note 1. 
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interpretation of the word “source” in the Clean Air Act to mean an entire plant 
as opposed to a single pollution-emitting device.50  In deciding whether it 
should defer to the agency’s interpretation, the Court announced a two-step 
inquiry to determine legitimate Executive Branch interpretations of statutory 
authority.  Under Chevron Step One, the reviewing court decides whether the 
statute speaks directly to the issue; if so, there is no need for any further 
interpretation and the matter is resolved at the first step.51  However, where the 
statutory meaning is ambiguous, the court moves to Step Two – asking 
whether the agency’s interpretation of the statute is a “permissible construction 
of the statute.”52  If the interpretation is deemed reasonable, Step Two is 
satisfied and there is no further inquiry for the court to make into the law’s 
meaning.53 
Chevron’s two-step process appeared to bring important clarity to the 
judicial role in assessing agency statutory interpretations by reining in a loose 
assortment of tests that courts had previously applied to such questions.54  The 
ruling rests on two foundational principles.  On the one hand, Chevron relies 
on Congress’s authorization of executive action.  This formal, delegation-based 
aspect of Chevron reinforces a dual-branch basis for administrative law in 
which the Executive acts as the agent of Congress.55  On the other hand, 
Chevron recognizes that the Executive’s technical specialization, expertise, 
and political accountability provide additional reasons for judicial deference, 
especially on matters in which courts lack sufficient expertise.  These formal 
 
50 See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 851-66 
(1984). 
51 See id. at 842-43. 
52 Id. at 843. 
53 See id. at 843-44. 
54 See Stephen Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law and Policy, 38 ADMIN. L. 
REV. 363, 370-82 (1986); Orin S. Kerr, Shedding Light on Chevron, 15 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 
52 n.193 (1998) (“Before Chevron was decided, there was a fairly broad scholarly 
consensus that judicial review doctrine was chaotic and unpredictable, if not nonexistent.”); 
Kenneth W. Starr, Judicial Review in the Post-Chevron Era, 3 YALE J. ON REG. 283, 284 
(1986) (“[Chevron] was . . . revolutionary because it eliminated significant ambiguity in the 
law and cast substantial doubt upon several well-established doctrines that had sometimes 
permitted courts to overturn agency interpretations.”); cf. Negusie v. Holder, 555 U.S. 511, 
529 (2009) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“Judicial deference to 
agencies’ views on statutes they administer was not born in [Chevron,] nor did the 
‘singularly judicial role of marking the boundaries of agency choice’ die with that case.” 
(citation omitted) (quoting Young v. Cmty. Nutrition Inst., 476 U.S. 974, 988 (1986) 
(Stevens, J., dissenting))).  
55 See Peter L. Strauss, Essay, “Deference” Is Too Confusing – Let’s Call Them 
“Chevron Space” and “Skidmore Weight,” 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1143, 1145 (2012) 
(“‘Chevron space’ denotes the area within which an administrative agency has been 
statutorily empowered to act in a manner that creates legal obligations or constraints – that 
is, its delegated or allocated authority.”). 
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and functional bases for deference make possible an increasingly complex 
world of administrative lawmaking and law interpretation.56 
Chevron also brought a level of simplicity to the law by instructing lower 
courts to credit the Executive’s superior competencies in law interpretation and 
application whenever Congress has delegated the Executive authority to act.  
This theory of a transfer of interpretive power from the Judiciary to the 
Executive is a critical feature of Chevron.  As Justice Scalia has explained, 
“Chevron . . . if it is to be believed, replaced this statute-by-statute evaluation 
(which was assuredly a font of uncertainty and litigation) with an across-the-
board presumption that, in the case of ambiguity, agency discretion is 
meant.”57  On the one hand, it allows the Executive Branch to bring its 
expertise, access to information, and democratic accountability to bear on 
questions courts are less equipped to decide.58  On the other hand, Chevron 
leaves it to Congress to delegate authority to the Executive.  After Chevron, 
“Congress now knows that the ambiguities it creates, whether intentionally or 
unintentionally, will be resolved, within the bounds of permissible 
interpretation, not by the courts but by a particular agency . . . .”59  Because 
Congress always retains the power to amend a statute to override a particular 
agency interpretation with which it does not agree, the Chevron framework 
gives fealty to the principle of legislative supremacy. 
3. From Youngstown to Chevron 
There are important congruities between Youngstown and Chevron that 
make both potentially useful in addressing the issue of judicial review in 
national security.  First, both tests place importance on congressional 
authorization of executive action.  In the case of Youngstown, however, it is 
often difficult to determine whether presidential invocation of a statute of 
questionable relevance is undertaken with “implicit” congressional backing 
(triggering the most deferential review under Youngstown Category One) or 
without congressional backing (triggering a more cautious Youngstown 
Category Two review).  Chevron is equally replete with its own gray areas 
that, properly understood, leave open many questions about how it should be 
applied in cases of congressional silence. To be sure, Chevron held that 
agencies should receive deference to reasonable interpretations of ambiguous 
 
56 Evan J. Criddle, Chevron’s Consensus, 88 B.U. L. REV. 1271, 1296 (2008) (arguing 
that Chevron deference rests on a “pragmatic consensus” of theories, including those based 
on congressional delegation and executive expertise); Katyal, supra note 32, at 106 
(“Historically, when courts decide whether to award deference to an executive 
interpretation, they have considered three factors: expertise, whether there has been a 
delegation from Congress, and political accountability.”).  
57 Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 
DUKE L.J. 511, 516. 
58 See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865-66. 
59 Scalia, supra note 57, at 517. 
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statutory provisions, but the Court left open many questions about the scope 
and breadth of agency deference.  As Justice Stevens explained, “‘[t]he 
power . . . to administer a congressionally created . . . program necessarily 
requires the formulation of policy and the making of rules to fill any gap 
left . . . by Congress’” within a particular statute.60  But precisely what is meant 
by “fill any gap” is a question that has caused considerable debate among 
judges and commentators.  Namely, it can be hard for a court to defer to an 
agency claiming interpretative authority according to a statute that only 
ambiguously grants that agency the power to act in the first place.  
Accordingly, courts have puzzled over questions such as the proper scope of an 
agency’s gap-filling role and the implications of a broad or narrow 
understanding of that interpretive function.61  Scholars have also debated these 
questions,62 and the controversy extends to Chevron’s application to the 
context of national security as well. 
B. The Chevron-in-National-Security-Law Argument 
The first article to apply Chevron to foreign affairs was Curtis Bradley’s 
Chevron Deference and Foreign Affairs.63  On the one hand, Bradley advances 
functionalist arguments for Chevron deference in national security, noting that 
Chevron “pushes ‘interpretive lawmaking’ to government entities that have 
more expertise and democratic accountability than courts” and 
“centraliz[es] . . . lawmaking in the executive branch rather than in a diffuse 
court system . . . [thereby] promot[ing] uniformity in the law.”64  On the other 
hand, he identifies the importance of the formal basis for Chevron deference, 
observing that “[t]he linchpin of the Chevron doctrine . . . is not realism or 
 
60 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 (second omission in original) (quoting Morton v. Ruiz, 415 
U.S. 199, 231 (1974)). 
61
 See, e.g., Nathan Alexander Sales & Jonathan H. Adler, The Rest Is Silence: Chevron 
Deference, Agency Jurisdiction, and Statutory Silences, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 1497, 1500 
(“The Supreme Court has yet to resolve whether Chevron deference should apply when an 
agency is interpreting the reach of its own jurisdiction . . . .”).  Compare Miss. Power & 
Light Co. v. Mississippi ex rel. Moore, 487 U.S. 354, 381-83 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring 
in the judgment) (concluding that Chevron applies to disputes about the scope of an 
agency’s jurisdiction), with id. at 386-87 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (disagreeing and asserting 
that Chevron does not apply to such disputes).   
62 Compare Quincy M. Crawford, Comment, Chevron Deference to Agency 
Interpretations That Delimit the Scope of the Agency’s Jurisdiction, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 957, 
958 (1994) (arguing that Chevron deference should apply in situations where an agency is 
interpreting an ambiguous statute to expand the scope of its delegation), with Ernest 
Gellhorn & Paul Verkuil, Controlling Chevron-Based Delegations, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 
989, 993-94 (1999) (arguing for “peripheral jurisdiction” limitations on the application of 
Chevron deference for agency actions beyond the core delegation of power and zone of 
authority in which an administrative agency operates).     
63 See Bradley, supra note 1. 
64 Id. at 673. 
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democratic theory, but rather a theory of delegation.”65  These formal 
foundations within the Chevron doctrine imply “a number of built-in 
limitations” to its reach.66  As Bradley points out: 
The delegation theory of Chevron requires that, in order to receive 
deference, the agency must be charged with administering the law in 
question.  This “administration” requirement is part of the textual basis 
for the presumed delegation, and it serves as a form of notice to Congress 
concerning which statutes will be subjected to the presumption.67 
The idea of giving deference only when there has been a clear delegation 
“limits both the number of laws subject to Chevron deference and the number 
of executive branch entities entitled to this deference.”68  Consequently, 
Bradley notes that “litigating positions . . . ‘wholly unsupported by regulations, 
rulings, or administrative practice’ are not entitled to Chevron deference.”69  
These limitations on “the form of the agency’s interpretation” mean that courts 
applying the Chevron rationale will not defer “to the executive branch’s ad hoc 
litigating positions, something that has been a particular concern in the foreign 
affairs area.”70 
Despite his acknowledgment of these limitations, Bradley still sees room for 
an expanded Chevron doctrine in certain contexts, arguing for vast executive 
power to resolve questions about the scope of agency authority under a 
particular statute.  Although, as a formal matter, “it might seem unreasonable 
to presume that Congress intended to delegate interpretive authority over that 
issue to the agency,”71 Bradley notes that “the line between interpretation of 
substantive provisions and interpretation of scope of authority is often unclear, 
and, in any event, agencies may have Chevron-relevant expertise concerning 
the latter issue.”72  On the one hand, he recognizes that this broad interpretation 
of the scope of executive authority is in some tension with the delegation 
 
65 See id. at 670; id. at 673 (“[Chevron] purports to preserve Congress’s role as the 
lawmaker.  Courts defer to agencies because Congress has presumptively delegated 
lawmaking power to those agencies.”); id. at 672 (rejecting the idea that Chevron “is a 
purely fictional label attached to functional considerations; in a variety of ways the Court 
limits the presumed delegation to situations in which there is a formal basis for concluding 
that Congress has transferred lawmaking authority”); id. at 672 n.87 (“It is . . . not correct to 
say, as many commentators have said casually, that the delegation is based simply on an 
ambiguity in the law that the agency is interpreting.  It is not the ambiguity by itself that 
creates the presumed delegation – it is also the fact that Congress has charged the agency 
with administering the law in question.”).   
66 Id. at 674. 
67 Id. at 674-75 (footnote omitted). 
68 Id. at 675. 
69 Id. (quoting Smiley v. Citibank (S.D.), N.A., 517 U.S. 735, 741 (1996)). 
70 Id. 
71 Id. at 682. 
72 Id. 
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requirement, for he argues that agency self-expansion cannot take place in the 
absence of any statutory language effectuating executive power.73  On the 
other hand, Bradley argues that concerns of an imperialistic Chevron doctrine 
can be put aside when national security is at issue.  Hence, “regardless of how 
this [scope-of-authority] issue should be resolved in general, there are 
particular reasons to apply Chevron deference to scope-of-authority issues in 
the foreign affairs context.”74  These reasons have to do with “[c]hanging 
world conditions and the executive branch’s unique access to foreign affairs 
information.”75  To support this claim, Bradley invokes substantive decisions 
of national security, which support the idea of broad deference to the 
Executive.  As he notes, “when Congress delegates foreign affairs authority to 
the executive branch, it often ‘must of necessity paint with a brush broader 
than that it customarily wields in domestic areas.’”76  Furthermore, Bradley 
highlights that, where national security is concerned, congressional delegations 
“may overlap with the executive branch’s independent lawmaking powers.”77  
Hence, concerns over an enlarged Chevron doctrine “have less force in the 
context of foreign affairs law – an area characterized long before Chevron by 
exceedingly broad executive branch power and sweeping deference by the 
courts.”78  Whatever danger may exist of expanding Chevron to give the 
Executive more power than Congress intended in other realms, “foreign affairs 
law poses substantially less danger of centralizing power in the executive 
branch than does applying it to other areas of law.”79 
Eric Posner and Cass Sunstein also apply Chevron to the national security 
context,80 though their more expansive interpretation is centered on the 
functional bases for deference, especially the Executive’s policy expertise, 
which, they argue, makes the Executive a superior actor in resolving statutory 
ambiguity.81  Posner and Sunstein celebrate Chevron as a useful device to 
“greatly simplify current law”82 and “allocate authority to the executive, which 
is in the best position to balance the competing interests” between liberty and 
security.83  In their view, “courts should play a smaller role than they currently 
 
73 Id. at 676-78. 
74 Id.  
75 Id. 
76 Id. at 682-83 (quoting Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 17 (1965)). 
77 Id. at 683. 
78 Id. at 673. 
79 Id. 
80 Posner & Sunstein, supra note 1. 
81 See id. at 1176; see also Ku & Yoo, supra note 1, at 202 (“Agencies which possess 
greater expertise over a complex and technical statute are less likely to depart from 
Congressional intent in their interpretations of those statutes, especially [in their 
interpretation of] ambiguous provisions in those statutes.”). 
82 See Posner & Sunstein, supra note 1, at 1173. 
83 Id.; see also id. at 1176 (stating that courts must “generally defer to the executive on 
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do in interpreting statutes that touch on foreign relations,”84 while “the 
executive branch should be given greater power than it currently has to decide 
whether the United States will violate international law.”85 
Posner and Sunstein seem to agree with Bradley that Chevron deference 
should apply to scope-of-authority questions and that “a grant of authority to 
the executive in the domain of foreign affairs ought generally to include a 
power of interpretation.”86  Yet while Bradley identifies constraints that the 
delegation requirement can place on Chevron deference, Posner and Sunstein’s 
interpretation is far more expansive.  Rather than attempt to ground Chevron in 
a formal, delegation-based foundation, they question that foundation, 
remarking that “Congress hardly ever states its instructions on the deference 
question with clarity, and thus Chevron cannot be grounded on an explicit or 
implicit legislative instruction on that question.”87  Indeed, they argue, “It is 
because statutes are often unclear that our argument, no less than Chevron 
itself, should have broad implications.”88  Posner and Sunstein’s view would in 
fact eliminate the role of Congress, at least insofar as national security is 
concerned, for they argue that in cases where the legislature has had no 
involvement in the policy matter at issue – that is, where “there is no 
interpretation of a statutory term but simply a policy judgment by the 
executive, the courts should defer as well, using Chevron as an analogy.”89  In 
short, their brand of Chevron welcomes its “imperialistic aspirations.”90   
Hence, while Bradley accepts an expansive view of scope-of-authority 
questions where national security is concerned, implying more modest 
limitations on Chevron’s delegation requirement, Posner and Sunstein offer a 
retreat from the delegation requirement altogether, rejecting the idea that such 
procedural barriers should get in the way of judicial deference when national 
security is concerned.  While Posner and Sunstein take comfort in the idea that 
Chevron’s Step Two reasonableness requirement will prevent the Executive 
 
the ground that resolving ambiguities requires judgments of policy and principle, and the 
foreign policy expertise of the executive places it in the best position to make those 
judgments”). 
84 Id. at 1177. 
85 Id.  
86 See id. at 1198. 
87 Id. at 1194. 
88 Id. at 1178. 
89 See id. at 1199; see also id. at 1205 (“[I]n the domain of foreign relations, the 
approach signaled in Chevron should apply even if the executive is not exercising delegated 
authority to make rules or conduct adjudications.”). 
90 Accord Sunstein, supra note 1, at 2672 (“In war no less than in peace, the inquiry into 
presidential authority can be organized and disciplined if it is undertaken with close 
reference to standard principles of administrative law.  These principles accord the President 
a great deal of discretion to interpret congressional authorizations for the use of force, 
subject only to the limits of reasonableness.  In short, Chevron has imperialistic 
aspirations.”). 
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Branch from suppressing civil liberties,91 they acknowledge in the same breath 
that Step Two invalidations, which “are rare in the domestic sphere . . . should 
be rare [within foreign affairs cases] as well.”92  On their view, Chevron is no 
longer a dual-branch framework for resolving complex national security cases; 
rather, it is a single-branch theory of governance that favors the more-expert 
Executive Branch. 
In a separate article, Sunstein applies this same functionalist interpretation 
of Chevron directly to the post-9/11 context and the cases decided during this 
period.93  He begins by highlighting the idea that administrative law provides 
the best “body of principles” to consider the President’s powers under the 
Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF)94 – the 2001 joint 
congressional resolution authorizing military action in Afghanistan.95  Viewing 
Chevron as the ideal test for scaling judicial review regarding executive 
decisions made pursuant to the AUMF, Sunstein finds “broad authority” within 
Chevron for the President “to construe ambiguities as he sees fit,”96 as well as 
permission for the Executive Branch to fill voids during times of legislative 
inertia.  As he puts it: “When Congress has not spoken, interpretations must 
depend, at least in part, on assessments of the consequences of one or another 
approach; agencies are in a comparatively good position to make such 
assessments.”97  Believing as he does that Congress will step in to address 
through direct legislation any particular agency interpretation with which it 
disagrees,98 Sunstein argues that the Executive Branch should be free to take 
the first step in determining national security policies. 
Sunstein anchors this argument in a doctrinal understanding of Chevron and 
a series of incentive-based arguments.  First, he argues that a formal delegation 
from Congress is not a necessary condition for broad Chevron deference and 
that “the grant of authority to act with the force of law is a sufficient but not a 
necessary condition for finding a grant of power to interpret ambiguous 
terms.”99  As far as Congress’s incentives are concerned, he argues that the 
 
91 See Posner & Sunstein, supra note 1, at 1198. 
92 See id. at 1198-99. 
93 See Sunstein, supra note 1. 
94 Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001).   
95 See Sunstein, supra note 1, at 2663 (“Is there a body of principles that can help to 
evaluate the legality of these actions under the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force 
(AUMF)?  I suggest that there is, and that it can be found in a single area: administrative 
law.”). 
96 Id. at 2665; see also id. at 2663-64 (“[P]residential action under the 2001 AUMF, or 
any imaginable AUMF, should be subject to the principles that have emerged in the wake of 
the Supreme Court’s extraordinarily influential decision in Chevron . . . .  As we shall see, 
the logic of Chevron applies to the exercise of executive authority in the midst of war.”). 
97 Id. at 2667. 
98 Id. at 2666 (“Congress knows that the President will construe any authorization to use 
force, and it has every incentive to limit his discretion if it so wishes.”). 
99 Id.  
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advantage of applying Chevron to national security is that it allows Congress 
to trump any executive interpretations it does not like through subsequent 
legislative enactments.100  Moreover, because “Congress knows that the 
President will construe any authorization to use force . . . it has every incentive 
to limit his discretion if it so wishes.”101  In cases where Congress does not 
limit presidential discretion, courts should assume an implicit decision by the 
legislature not to cabin executive power.102  This means that, in the context of 
the AUMF, the resolution should be “taken, by its very nature, as an implicit 
delegation to the President to resolve ambiguities as he (reasonably) sees 
fit.”103  Such a position adheres to “Congress’s likely expectations, to the 
extent that they exist . . . [and] imposes exactly the right incentives on 
Congress, by requiring it to limit the President’s authority through plain text if 
that is what it wishes to do.”104 
C. Chevron’s Limitations 
While the Chevron-in-national-security argument provides a potentially 
attractive and rather simple solution to the vexing problems caused by gaps 
within statutory authorizations or in cases where Congress fails to delegate 
authority to the President, the argument tends to depart from recent doctrinal 
developments in both the domestic and national security contexts.  Those cases 
undermine the arguments of Chevron-backers that their approach provides a 
compelling, practical solution for the national security context, especially 
during times of congressional inertia.  Two questions that have arisen in the 
domestic context have particular salience where the argument for Chevron 
deference in national security is concerned.  Both involve the potential 
expansion of Chevron where legislative intent is unclear. The first question 
concerns the power of agencies to decide their zone of authority under a given 
piece of enabling legislation,105 and the second concerns the kinds of agency 
 
100 Id. 
101 Id. 
102 See id. 
103 Id. 
104 Id.  A number of other scholars have made the Chevron-in-national-security argument 
as well.  See e.g., Ku & Yoo, supra note 1, at 194-95.  Yoo and Ku discuss Chevron’s 
recognition of  
two institutional characteristics that make [the Executive] superior to courts in the 
interpretations of certain kinds of laws.  First, executive agencies usually possess 
expertise in the administration of certain statutes, particularly those in complex areas.  
Second, the executive branch is subject to greater political accountability than the 
judiciary, and the electorate could ultimately change unwanted interpretations.  
Id. at 201.   
105 There are, of course, numerous shades of gray in this analysis that include the 
“distance between an agency’s core jurisdiction and the proposed extension of its authority,” 
the importance of the issue, and whether another agency also has responsibility in the field 
in question.  Gellhorn & Verkuil, supra note 62, at 1015-16.   
  
1934 BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 92:1917 
 
decisions – formal versus informal; rules versus adjudications – that call for 
Chevron deference in the first place.  While these issues can overlap – for 
instance, an agency might expand its jurisdiction so far that it regulates activity 
it has not been delegated the power to regulate – courts have generally treated 
these questions separately. 
1. Step One Deference to Agency Self-Expansion 
One important question Chevron did not address explicitly is whether courts 
should defer when an agency self-expands and regulates activity that appears 
to fall beyond the scope of the zone of authority in which it operates.  This 
problem arose in Dole v. United Steelworkers of America,106 a case decided six 
years after Chevron.  Dole held that the Office of Management and Budget 
(OMB) exceeded the scope of its authority under the Paperwork Reduction Act 
when it rejected Department of Labor (DOL) standards imposing various 
disclosure requirements on manufacturers intended to protect employees from 
exposure to hazardous chemicals.107  Under the Paperwork Reduction Act, 
federal agencies are prohibited from adopting regulations imposing paperwork 
requirements on the public where the information is not available to the agency 
from another source within the federal government.108  Citing its power to 
regulate “information collection requests” under the Paperwork Reduction Act, 
OMB disapproved of the DOL provisions, claiming that they lacked required 
exemptions and applied to scenarios in which the disclosures did not benefit 
employees.109  However, the Court found that the Paperwork Reduction Act 
was intended to apply to “information-gathering rules,” not “disclosure rules,” 
and therefore did not clearly grant the OMB statutory authority to countermand 
agency regulations requiring disclosure by regulated entities directly to third 
parties.110  Finding that OMB engaged in improper self-expansion, the Court 
refused to defer, and it reinstated the DOL rule.111 
In their disagreement over the scope of the OMB’s regulatory authority, 
Dole’s majority and dissenting Justices clashed on the broader question 
regarding agency “peripheral jurisdiction” over scope-of-authority questions.  
While the Court majority looked to the statute’s language, history, and 
structure to determine that OMB exceeded the reach of its delegation under the 
plain text of the statute,112 the dissenting Justices asserted that the majority’s 
analysis upended Chevron by engaging in needless statutory analysis.113  
Rejecting the majority’s dissection of “numerous statutory provisions and 
 
106 494 U.S. 26 (1990). 
107 Id. at 42-43. 
108 Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980, 44 U.S.C. §§ 3501-3521 (2006). 
109 Dole, 494 U.S. at 30-31.  
110 Id. at 34-35. 
111 Id. at 43-44. 
112 Id. at 41.   
113 Id. at 43-44 (White, J., dissenting). 
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legislative history” that were themselves inconclusive as to whether OMB 
could regulate disclosure rules, Justice White’s dissenting opinion concluded 
that the statute’s patent ambiguities required the Court to move immediately to 
Chevron Step Two, where the OMB’s interpretation was easily validated under 
Chevron’s “reasonableness” prong.114 
The issue of peripheral jurisdiction resurfaced ten years later when the Court 
decided FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., another example of the 
Court rejecting broad agency self-expansion when the FDA sought to regulate 
the advertising and sale of certain tobacco products.115  Having been 
authorized by Congress to regulate “drugs” and “devices” under the Food, 
Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938 (FDCA),116 the FDA argued that the nicotine 
found in cigarettes qualified as a “drug” and that cigarettes were themselves 
“drug delivery devices.”117  Accordingly, the FDA argued that the regulation of 
tobacco products fell within its delegated authority.  The Court took the 
alternate view that the FDCA, which was silent on the subject of tobacco, 
implicitly restricted the FDA from regulating tobacco and that the FDA’s effort 
to regulate it constituted improper agency self-expansion.118  The Court 
reached its holding without taking a position on the broader question of 
peripheral jurisdiction and instead considered the particular question of agency 
power through the lens of Chevron Step One, as it had done in Dole.119  Justice 
O’Connor, writing for a five-member majority, held that the statute, 
understood in the proper context of other federal legislation, precluded the 
FDA from regulating tobacco.120  While the FDA had “exhaustively 
documented” its findings that “‘tobacco products are unsafe,’ and 
‘dangerous,’”121 allowing the FDA to ban tobacco products would undermine 
legislative intent, given that Congress had “addressed the problem of 
tobacco . . . on six occasions since 1965” and “stopped well short of ordering a 
ban.”122  Hence, the Court struck down the FDA’s expansion of its own 
jurisdiction as an impermissible construction of the statute at Step One.123 
 
114 Id. at 53.   
115 FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 160 (2000). 
116 21 U.S.C. § 301 (2006). 
117 Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 131. 
118 Id. at 132-43. 
119 Id. at 132.  The Fourth Circuit, by contrast, had explicitly held that expansions of 
agency jurisdiction should not generally receive Chevron deference.  Brown & Williamson 
Tobacco Corp. v. FDA, 153 F.3d 155, 161-62 (4th Cir. 1998). 
120 Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 161. 
121 Id. (citing Regulations Restricting the Sale and Distribution of Cigarettes and 
Smokeless Tobacco to Protect Children and Adolescents, 61 Fed. Reg. 44,396, 44,632-33 
(Aug. 28, 1996) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 801, 803, 804, 807, 820, 897)). 
122 See id. at 137-39.   
123 Id. at 161. 
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2. Chevron Step Zero 
A closely related issue concerns whether courts should apply Chevron in 
cases where it remains unclear if an agency is acting with statutory 
authorization in the first place, or when it is unclear if the agency’s decision, 
even though the product of a delegation, actually carries the force of law.124  
One example involves the use of informal agency procedures.  In Christensen 
v. Harris County,125 the Court rejected the idea that an informal agency 
opinion letter issued by the Department of Labor should be analyzed under the 
Chevron framework.126  The Court held that “[i]nterpretations such as those in 
opinion letters – like interpretations contained in policy statements, agency 
manuals, and enforcement guidelines, all of which lack the force of law – do 
not warrant Chevron-style deference.”127  Instead, such interpretations are 
entitled to the lesser Skidmore128 deference and will be upheld based upon their 
“power to persuade.”129 
In United States v. Mead,130 the Court applied a similar analysis to hold that 
informal Customs ruling letters do not warrant Chevron deference.  At issue in 
Mead were letters that are routinely issued by the Customs Service at ports of 
entry, assigning tariff rates to individual goods.  Mead held that those letters, 
which are not subject to notice and comment (though “made ‘available for 
public inspection’”131), did not trigger Chevron deference, as the agency 
interpretation was not promulgated in the exercise of congressionally delegated 
authority.132 
The Mead Court squarely took on the theoretical question about whether 
resort to Chevron is ever appropriate in cases where the particular agency 
action might not be the product of a legislative delegation.  On this question, 
 
124 See Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833, 
836 (2001) (recognizing that, in some cases, the question remains “whether courts should 
turn to the Chevron framework at all”).   
125 529 U.S. 576 (2000). 
126 Id. at 587. 
127 Id.   
128 Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944).   
129 Id. at 40.  Justice Scalia, who concurred in the judgment in Christensen, agreed with 
the holding but disagreed with the majority’s Chevron analysis.  He argued that “Skidmore 
deference to authoritative agency views is an anachronism” and that the DOL position 
“warrants Chevron deference if it represents the authoritative view of the Department of 
Labor.”  Christensen, 529 U.S. at 589, 591 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in 
the judgment).  Justice Scalia would have found the viewpoint of the DOL opinion letter 
“authoritative” based on the fact that it was signed by the Acting Administrator of the Wage 
and Hour Division but not a “reasonable” interpretation under Step Two of Chevron.  Id.  
130 533 U.S. 218 (2001).   
131 Id. at 223 (quoting 19 U.S.C. § 1625(a) (2006)).   
132 Id. at 227.  The case was vacated and remanded for a determination whether the 
letters should be upheld under Skidmore.  Id.   
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often known as “Chevron Step Zero,”133 the Court held that the critical 
question is whether Congress appears to have “delegated authority to the 
agency generally to make rules carrying the force of law, and . . . the agency 
interpretation claiming deference was promulgated in the exercise of that 
authority.”134  Where the agency is exercising such authority, Chevron 
deference is appropriate; where it is not, courts should apply deference regimes 
(such as Skidmore) that give less weight to the agency decision.135  
Importantly, the Mead Court refused to provide a clear definition of what, 
exactly, indicates a congressional delegation.  Rather, the Court stated that a 
“[d]elegation of such authority may be shown in a variety of ways, as by an 
agency’s power to engage in adjudication or notice-and-comment rulemaking, 
or by some other indication of a comparable congressional intent.”136  
Deciding whether an agency is taking action carrying the force of law pursuant 
to a legislative delegation varies with the circumstances, with courts “look[ing] 
to the degree of the agency’s care, its consistency, formality, and relative 
expertness, and to the persuasiveness of the agency’s position”137 to determine 
the amount of deference owed to the agency.  While the Court observed that, 
on occasion, Chevron might apply “even when no such administrative 
formality” is apparent, it did not delve further into when, exactly, those 
formalities could be set aside.138  Hence, while Mead indicates that the Court 
will reserve stronger Chevron deference for agency action bearing a greater 
quantum of procedural formality, the Court did not speak with unmistakable 
clarity to the necessary conditions that trigger Chevron deference. 
To be sure, Mead provides some expression of the idea that agency 
decisions that are not the product of formal administrative procedures can still 
qualify for Chevron deference.139  Hence, on a certain reading of Mead, courts 
could expand dramatically the domain of Executive Branch decisions that are 
eligible for Chevron deference.  But this Executive-friendly interpretation of 
Mead is not borne out in the case law.  After Mead, the Supreme Court 
generally cabined Chevron’s expansion at the Step Zero phase.140  For 
example, in Gonzales v. Oregon,141 the Court employed Mead to reject the 
Attorney General’s effort to regulate activities generally under the purview of 
 
133 See generally Sunstein, supra note 33.   
134 Mead, 533 U.S. at 226-27.   
135 Id.   
136 Id. at 227.   
137 Id. at 228 (footnotes omitted).   
138 Id. at 231.   
139 Id. (“[W]e have sometimes found reasons for Chevron deference even when no 
administrative formality was required and none was afforded.”). 
140 See Katyal, supra note 32, at 108 (pointing out that Mead “established that rules made 
pursuant to delegated powers are entitled to comprehensive deference under Chevron, but 
that interpretations issued outside that scope receive more skepticism”). 
141 546 U.S. 243 (2006).   
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Health and Human Services (HHS).  The case involved Oregon’s assisted 
suicide program that allowed physicians to administer fatal drugs to terminally 
ill patients.142  When former Attorney General John Ashcroft issued an 
interpretive rule construing the Controlled Substances Act to restrict the use of 
these substances for physician-assisted suicide,143 the Court held that 
Ashcroft’s ruling was not entitled to Chevron deference under the principles 
outlined in Mead.144  Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, found that the 
interpretive rule was not promulgated pursuant to congressionally delegated 
authority, and thus Chevron did not apply.145  Looking to the language of the 
Controlled Substances Act, Justice Kennedy found that the Attorney General 
was not granted such broad authority to promulgate rules where legitimate 
medical practice and state-authorized treatment of patients were concerned.146  
Instead, the statute limited the Attorney General’s role to promulgating rules 
involving the regulation and control of controlled substances and “the efficient 
execution of his functions” under the statute.147  The Court observed that the 
Controlled Substances Act consistently delegates medical judgments to the 
Secretary of HHS, not the Attorney General, and the Attorney General’s 
powers are explicitly limited on the face of the statute.148  Because the 
interpretive rule went beyond the scope of the Attorney General’s authority 
under the statute, the Court found only Skidmore deference to be 
appropriate,149 and the Court rejected the Attorney General’s interpretation 
under that test because “the statute manifests no intent to regulate the practice 
of medicine generally.”150 
More recently, in Negusie v. Holder,151 the Court again engaged in a 
narrower reading of Chevron.  Negusie involved an interpretation by the Board 
of Immigration Appeals (BIA) of the “persecutor bar” under the asylum 
provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act.152  The persecutor bar 
restricts asylum relief for certain asylum seekers who have participated in the 
 
142 Id. at 248-49.   
143 Dispensing of Controlled Substances To Assist Suicide, 66 Fed. Reg. 56,607 (Nov. 9, 
2001) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 1306).   
144 Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 258.   
145 Id. at 258-68.   
146 Id. at 258.   
147 Id. at 259-61 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 871(b) (2006)).   
148 Id. at 265-68.   
149 Id. at 268.   
150 Id. at 270.   
151 555 U.S. 511 (2009).   
152 The persecutor bar, which was enacted as part of the Refugee Act of 1980, precludes 
asylum or withholding of removal relief for foreign nationals who previously “assisted . . . 
or otherwise participated in the persecution of any person on account of race, religion, 
nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.”  8 U.S.C. § 
1101(a)(42) (2006). 
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persecution of others,153 and in Negusie, the BIA interpreted the statutory 
language “persecutor of others” to apply to an individual who had been forced 
by the Eritrean government to persecute prisoners on the basis of their national 
origin.154 In denying Negusie’s application for asylum and withholding of 
removal,155 the agency relied on an earlier Supreme Court decision, Fedorenko 
v. United States,156 which held that a similar bar contained within the 
Displaced Persons Act of 1948 (DPA)157 – a law designed to provide relief to 
displaced refugees from World War II158 – did not contain a duress 
exception.159  But the Negusie Court rejected the BIA’s reliance on 
Fedorenko.160  The Court found that the design of the statute at issue in 
Negusie deviated from the purpose of the legislation at issue in Fedorenko161 
and refused to give the BIA’s statutory construction Chevron deference, as the 
government had argued.162  In an interpretation of Chevron reflective of other 
cases limiting the doctrine’s scope, the Negusie Court recognized that although 
the BIA was empowered under Chevron to exercise its “interpretive authority” 
on the admittedly ambiguous statute,163 its reliance on prior case law (here, 
Fedorenko) fell outside the type of interpretive matters contemplated by 
Chevron.164  Accordingly, the Court ordered that the case be sent back to the 
BIA for a redetermination of the statutory interpretation question.165 
 
153 See id. 
154 Negusie, 555 U.S. at 516. 
155 Negusie was granted a limited form of relief under the Convention Against Torture, 
which contains no similar bar to relief for those who have engaged in the persecution or 
torture of others.  Id. at 536 n.6 (Stevens, J. concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 
540-42 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
156 449 U.S. 490 (1981).   
157 Displaced Persons Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-774, 62 Stat. 1009 (originally codified 
at 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 1951-1965 (1952)). 
158 Fedorenko, 449 U.S. at 495.   
159 Id. at 512.   
160 Negusie, 555 U.S. at 520-23 (“Fedorenko, which addressed a different statute enacted 
for a different purpose, does not control the BIA’s interpretation of this persecutor bar.”).   
161 Id. at 520 (“Unlike the DPA, which was enacted to address not just the post war 
refugee problem but also the Holocaust and its horror, the Refugee Act was designed to 
provide a general rule for the ongoing treatment of all refugees and displaced persons.”).   
162 Brief for the Respondent at 10-11, Negusie, 555 U.S. 511 (No. 07-499) (“Because this 
case raises questions ‘implicating an agency’s construction of a statute which it 
administers,’ principles of Chevron deference control.” (quoting  INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 
526 U.S. 415, 424 (1999))).   
163 Negusie, 555 U.S. at 522.   
164 Id. at 522-23.  
165 Id. at 523. 
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D. Squaring Chevron with Domestic Law 
It is important to keep in mind that the Chevron Court considered a 
comprehensive statutory scheme in which both the statute and legislative 
history contained strong evidence that Congress intended the EPA to regulate a 
fairly specific class of emissions generated by “stationary sources,” leaving to 
agency discretion only the technical definition of a particular term.166  The 
agency was clearly vested with policymaking authority to reduce the 
production of certain harmful emissions.167  In the Court own words, Chevron 
involved an administrative agency’s filling of a legislative gap, not its 
enactment of an entire scheme or its expansion of authority into a realm not 
plainly included within the original delegation.168 Because the statutory term 
was ambiguous, the only remaining question was the reasonableness of the 
EPA’s definition.169 
This context behind Chevron’s holding, however implicit it might be to the 
language of the actual opinion, is reflected in Mead and its progeny, which 
clarify the importance of a congressional delegation of law-interpreting 
authority as a condition for agency deference.  While Chevron and Mead both 
recognize the possibility of agency policymaking based on an “implicit 
authority,”170 the decision does not support unbounded deference where the 
agency regulates matters falling outside its specialized expertise.  Indeed, “the 
more significant the question and the greater the impact that expansion of the 
agency’s jurisdiction is likely to have, the greater the likelihood that Congress 
did not intend implicitly to delegate that determination to an agency.”171 
To the extent that Chevron and Mead leave room for doubt, subsequent 
cases reaffirm the point.  For example, the Brown & Williamson Court placed 
limits on the FDA’s self-expansion of regulatory power over tobacco, a “major 
segment of the economy”172 that was not clearly contained within the FDA’s 
delegated authority.  The Gonzales Court similarly refused to defer to the 
DOJ’s self-expansion to regulate matters outside its delegation that fell under 
 
166 Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 840 (1984). 
167 Id. at 846.  The Court, after examining the statutory language and legislative history 
and employing traditional canons of statutory construction, found no conclusive evidence 
that Congress ever intended the term to carry a particular meaning.  Id. at 864.  
168 Id. at 843-44. 
169 Id. at 864. 
170 See id. at 844 (“Sometimes the legislative delegation to an agency on a particular 
question is implicit rather than explicit.  In such a case, a court may not substitute its own 
construction of a statutory provision for a reasonable interpretation made by the 
administrator of an agency.”); see also United States v. Mead, 533 U.S. 218, 227 (2001) 
(“Delegation of such authority may be shown in a variety of ways, as by an agency’s power 
to engage in adjudication or notice-and-comment rulemaking . . . .”).   
171 Gellhorn & Verkuil, supra note 62, at 1008.   
172 Id. at 1009.   
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the authority of HHS.173  These rulings are clearly motivated by the goal of 
effectuating congressional intent and avoiding the unleashing of a broad and 
unbounded agency power that prevails unless and until Congress reverses the 
agency through new legislation. 
While Sunstein identifies these limitations to Chevron’s reach in the 
domestic context,174 he engages in a creative reinterpretation of post-Chevron 
doctrine to substantiate the brand of “super-strong” Chevron deference he has 
in mind for national security law.  For example, Sunstein argues that despite 
Mead’s preference that an agency “‘engage in adjudication or notice-and-
comment rulemaking’”175 as a basis for according Chevron deference, other 
language within Mead supports broad deference where a Court can find “‘some 
other indication of a congressional comparable intent.’”176  Sunstein takes the 
argument even further by arguing that Chevron deference is appropriate “for 
informal decisions, and even for those lacking the force of law, if Congress is 
best read as calling for such deference in light of ‘the interpretive method used 
and the nature of the question at issue.’”177  Referring to lower court decisions 
that defer to agency interpretations lacking Mead’s formal procedures, 
Sunstein turns Mead’s analysis on its head: “Under Chevron and Mead, the 
real question is what were Congress’s instructions, and the grant of authority to 
act with the force of law is a sufficient but not a necessary condition for 
finding a grant of power to interpret ambiguous terms.”178   
 Posner and Sunstein make a similar argument in their co-authored article.  
While they recognize that, ordinarily, “the executive should be entitled to 
Chevron deference under the terms of existing doctrine because it will be 
acting pursuant to formal procedures or other channels that trigger Chevron,” 
they argue that courts should apply Chevron even when “no such [formal] 
mechanisms are involved.”179  Their view requires neither a delegation nor 
formal procedural mechanisms to trigger broad Chevron deference.  But this 
view of Chevron is hard to square with Mead, which specified the need for 
“comparable congressional intent” to a formal delegation as a condition for 
Chevron deference.180  The Mead Court noted that such intent could be 
discerned where an agency “provides for a relatively formal administrative 
 
173 Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 250 (2006). 
174 See Posner & Sunstein, supra note 1, at 1176. 
175 Sunstein, supra note 1, at 2665 (quoting Mead, 533 U.S. at 227).   
176 Id. (quoting Mead, 533 U.S. at 227).   
177 Id. at 2666 (quoting Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 222 (2002)).   
178 Id.; cf. Vermeule, supra note 1, at 1125 (“Roughly speaking, the requisite 
congressional intent to delegate law-interpreting power to the agency can be evidenced by 
the agency’s authorized use of formal proceedings, although procedural formality is 
arguably neither necessary nor sufficient for finding a congressional intent to delegate.”).   
179 Posner & Sunstein, supra note 1, at 1198.   
180 See Mead, 533 U.S. at 227. 
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procedure,”181 as such requirements “tend[] to foster the fairness and 
deliberation that should underlie a pronouncement of such force.”182  Indeed, 
rather than provide mechanisms for the Executive to bypass the delegation 
requirement, Mead reaffirms it, all the while acknowledging the possibility of 
alternative mechanisms that, owing to their formality, could be accorded the 
same weight as a formal delegation.  It is hard to square this language in Mead 
with the type of “super-strong” deference called for by Chevron-backers, a 
point reinforced by more recent Supreme Court interpretations.   
 To the extent that Chevron-backers acknowledge this trend, they argue that 
the national security context provides an exception on account of the 
Executive’s constitutional powers under Article II, which strengthen the case 
for deference where national security is concerned.  Hence, for Chevron-
backers, the standard requirements for Chevron deference “have less force in 
the context of foreign affairs law – an area characterized long before Chevron 
by exceedingly broad executive branch power and sweeping deference by the 
courts.”183  But, inasmuch as Chevron-backers tend to present a view of 
administrative law that discounts Mead in order to pursue an imperialistic 
Chevron doctrine, their view of national security law relies on an equally 
idealized account of that field, for their Executive-friendly interpretations of 
national security law tend to disregard Youngstown and the constraints it has 
placed on broad presidential powers. 
E. Squaring Chevron with National Security Law 
While many Chevron-backers acknowledge that they stretch the boundary of 
Chevron beyond its traditional limits, they argue that an expanded Chevron 
doctrine in national security makes sense in light of the Court’s national 
security precedents.  Here, they invoke United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export 
Corp. as a paradigm case that accords with a broad reading of Chevron.184  In 
Curtiss-Wright, the Supreme Court upheld an arms embargo passed by 
congressional joint resolution and ordered by President Roosevelt.  Justice 
Sutherland’s majority opinion celebrated the President’s “very delicate, 
 
181 Id. at 227, 230 (emphasis added).   
182 Id. at 230. 
183 Bradley, supra note 1, at 673; see also Posner & Sunstein, supra note 1, at 1176 
(arguing that “courts should generally defer to the executive on the ground that resolving 
ambiguities requires judgments of policy and principle, and the foreign policy expertise of 
the executive places it in the best position to make those judgments”).   
184 United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936); see also Pearlstein, 
supra note 9, at 794.  As Pearlstein explains, “strong notions of judicial deference to the 
executive in foreign relations matters are traced most commonly to United States v. Curtiss-
Wright Export Corp., a peacetime case in which the Court embraced the President’s reading 
of a statute delegating authority to the executive to place an embargo on arms sales to 
certain countries.”  Id. 
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plenary and exclusive power”185 in national security, which he enjoyed by 
virtue of being “the sole organ of the federal government in the field of 
international relations.”186  For Sutherland, these vast powers did not depend 
on a grant of legislative authorization; rather, they were derived from non-
textual sources of authority that inhered in the Executive itself.187 
For many foreign affairs scholars, Curtiss-Wright ushered in an extended 
period of tremendous judicial deference to presidential discretion on matters of 
national security.188  Harold Koh argues that Curtiss-Wright’s expansive 
interpretation of Executive power was the “touchstone of the Court’s foreign 
affairs jurisprudence” from the period between World War II through Vietnam 
and into the post-Cold War era.189  David Gray Adler notes that even when 
Curtiss-Wright’s “sole organ” concept has “not been invoked by name, its 
spirit, indeed its talismanic aura, has provided a common thread in a pattern of 
cases that has exalted presidential power above constitutional norms.”190  On 
this view, Curtiss-Wright ushered in an “increased deference across the 
spectrum of foreign affairs doctrines”191 and quickly outpaced Youngstown as 
the leading judicial pronouncement on deference to executive decisionmaking 
in national security law.192  For Koh, this period was marked by a disregard for 
Youngstown, in which the Supreme Court “threw its weight toward Curtiss-
Wright, which has now reemerged as the touchstone of the Court’s foreign 
affairs jurisprudence.”193 
 
185 Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 320.   
186 Id.   
187 Id. (stating that the President’s vast power did “not require as a basis for its exercise 
an act of Congress”).   
188 The Court has discussed the importance of broad deference to the political branches 
in the realm of foreign affairs on other occasions.  See, e.g., Chi. & S. Air Lines, Inc. v. 
Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 111 (1948) (“[T]he very nature of executive decisions 
as to foreign policy is political, not judicial.  Such decisions are wholly confided by our 
Constitution to the political departments of the government, Executive and Legislative.”); 
Oetjen v. Cent. Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 302 (1918) (“The conduct of the foreign relations 
of our Government is committed by the Constitution to the executive and legislative – ‘the 
political’ – departments of the government, and the propriety of what may be done in the 
exercise of this political power is not subject to judicial inquiry or decision.”).  
189 See Koh, supra note 23, at 1309.  
190 David Gray Adler, Court, Constitution, and Foreign Affairs, in THE CONSTITUTION 
AND THE CONDUCT OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 19, 25 (David Gray Adler & Larry N. 
George eds., 1996).   
191 Robert Knowles, American Hegemony and the Foreign Affairs Constitution, 41 ARIZ. 
ST. L.J. 87, 123, 126 (2009).   
192 See, e.g., id. at 125 n.247 (“The prominent exception to special deference during this 
period is, arguably, the Steel Seizure Case.”).   
193 Koh, supra note 23, at 1309; see also Adler, supra note 190, at 19 (“The 
unmistakable trend [has been] toward executive domination of U.S. foreign affairs in the 
past sixty years . . . .”); Prakash & Ramsey, supra note 29, at 238 (“The practice of the last 
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Many national security scholars argue that Curtiss-Wright’s triumph over 
Youngstown can be traced to Dames & Moore v. Regan, a case decided forty-
five years after Curtiss-Wright.194  In Dames & Moore, the Supreme Court 
vindicated an executive order by President Carter at the culmination of the Iran 
Hostage Crisis.  The order nullified all attachments against Iranian assets and 
directed that those assets be transferred to Iran.195  More controversially, it 
suspended all pending lawsuits against Iran in U.S. courts, transferring them to 
an international tribunal.196  While the Dames & Moore Court upheld the 
President’s broad power to nullify and suspend lawsuits as part of a larger 
negotiation to end the hostage crisis, it resolved the case on statutory as 
opposed to constitutional grounds.  The Court held that Congress had 
implicitly delegated the President power to nullify attachments and direct that 
the underlying funds be redirected to the government of Iran.197  Although the 
source of legislative power, the International Emergency Economic Powers 
Act (IEEPA), was silent regarding the suspension of in personam actions,198 
Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for a unanimous Court, noted that this statute, 
operating in combination with the 1868 Hostage Act, “indicat[ed] 
congressional acceptance of a broad scope for executive action in 
circumstances such as those presented in this case”199 and supported a general 
mandate for the presidential action at issue. 
Most foreign affairs scholars treat Dames & Moore as the statutory-
interpretation equivalent of Curtiss-Wright, and there is certainly some 
language in Dames & Moore that supports such an interpretation.  As then-
Associate Justice Rehnquist stated, “Congress cannot anticipate and legislate 
with regard to every possible action the President may find it necessary to take 
or every possible situation in which he might act,”200 and the mere “failure of 
Congress specifically to delegate authority does not, ‘especially . . . in the areas 
of foreign policy and national security,’ imply ‘congressional disapproval’ of 
 
century and an array of judicial opinions support the idea of presidential primacy.”).   
194 Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981).   
195 Id. at 660. 
196 Id.   
197 Id. at 669-86.   
198 Id. at 675 (“We conclude that although the IEEPA authorized the nullification of the 
attachments, it cannot be read to authorize the suspension of the claims.  The claims of 
American citizens against Iran are not in themselves transactions involving Iranian property 
or efforts to exercise any rights with respect to such property.  An in personam lawsuit, 
although it might eventually be reduced to judgment and that judgment might be executed 
upon, is an effort to establish liability and fix damages and does not focus on any particular 
property within the jurisdiction.  The terms of the IEEPA therefore do not authorize the 
President to suspend claims in American courts.  This is the view of all the courts which 
have considered the question.”). 
199 Id. at 677.   
200 Id. at 678.   
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action taken by the Executive.”201  The majority pointed to the lack of any 
statement by Congress opposing the measure.  Finding no explicit disapproval 
for the order, the Court upheld it. 
In a certain sense, Dames & Moore’s analysis of the issue of congressional 
inaction suggests a potential retreat from Youngstown.  Hence, as Martin 
Sheffer argues, “The decision in Dames & Moore underscored the same 
principle articulated almost a half-century earlier in Curtiss-Wright – the 
President was the primary governmental authority over matters of foreign 
policy.”202  On this view, Dames & Moore illustrates the Curtiss-Wright 
principle that “the anarchic nature of the world requires the President to do 
what is necessary to protect the nation’s interests, including exercising 
authority that the law does not appear to grant him.”203  Harold Koh echoes this 
sentiment, arguing that Dames & Moore “dramatically alter[ed] the application 
of Youngstown’s constitutional analysis in foreign affairs cases.”204  Hence, 
while Dames & Moore “talks like Youngstown” by requiring a statutory 
delegation for the President’s actions at the end of the Iran Hostage Crisis, it 
“walks like Curtiss-Wright”205 by giving the President an expanded national 
security power during times of emergency.206 
But this apparent link between Dames & Moore and Curtiss-Wright seems 
overstated.  While the Dames & Moore Court upheld presidential power, it did 
not wax rhapsodic over inherent executive powers or adopt Justice 
Sutherland’s plenary-powers rationale in Curtiss-Wright.  On the contrary, 
Dames & Moore emphasized limits on executive power by couching the 
President’s authority within legislative authorization.207  Indeed, from the 
 
201 Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 291 (1981)).   
202 MARTIN S. SHEFFER, THE JUDICIAL DEVELOPMENT OF PRESIDENTIAL WAR POWERS 136 
(1999); see also DANIEL A. FARBER ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
947 (1993) (“Justice Rehnquist’s opinion makes more sense under Curtiss-Wright than it 
does under the Steel Seizure opinion . . . .”).   
203 See Knowles, supra note 191, at 127.   
204 See Koh, supra note 23, at 1310-11.   
205 See Roy E. Brownell II, The Coexistence of United States v. Curtiss-Wright and 
Youngstown Sheet & Tube v. Sawyer in National Security Jurisprudence, 16 J.L. & POL. 1, 
68 (2000).   
206 Koh argues that “the Court has built on Dames & Moore to construct a Curtiss-Wright 
orientation toward statutory construction that now challenges Youngstown’s vision of 
institutional and constitutional balance.”  Koh, supra note 23, at 1311; see also Knowles, 
supra note 191, at 125 (“The Curtiss-Wright brand of special foreign affairs deference 
became firmly entrenched during the Cold War under a cloud of Soviet expansionism and 
the risk of nuclear conflict.”).   
207 Henry P. Monaghan, The Protective Power of the Presidency, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 
51-52 (1993) (recognizing Dames & Moore as “an important illustration of the” idea that 
“[s]tatutes constitute the main source of presidential authority to invade private rights in the 
foreign affairs context”). 
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perspective of Curtiss-Wright, the discussion of executive power in Dames & 
Moore looks far more constrained: 
[W]e re-emphasize the narrowness of our decision.  We do not decide that 
the President possesses plenary power to settle claims, even as against 
foreign governmental entities. . . .  But where, as here, the settlement of 
claims has been determined to be a necessary incident to the resolution of 
a major foreign policy dispute between our country and another, and 
where, as here, we can conclude that Congress acquiesced in the 
President’s action, we are not prepared to say that the President lacks the 
power to settle such claims.208 
Hence, it may stretch the argument too far to interpret Dames & Moore as a 
statutory proxy for Curtiss-Wright’s apparent constitutionalizing of plenary 
executive powers.  Indeed, Dames & Moore’s theory of law, if not its outcome, 
can be squared with Youngstown. 
Although the underlying theory of deference in Curtiss-Wright cannot be 
reconciled with Youngstown, its outcome is consistent with Jackson’s 
framework – a point Jackson himself noted.  Jackson placed Curtiss-Wright 
within Category One of his framework, in which “the President acts pursuant 
to an express or implied authorization of Congress” and in which “his authority 
is at its maximum, for it includes all that he possesses in his own right plus all 
that Congress can delegate.”209  As Jackson explained, to the extent dicta in 
Curtiss-Wright “intimated that the President might act in external affairs 
without congressional authority,”210 the decision did not go so far as to claim 
the President “might act contrary to an Act of Congress.”211  If Justice 
Sutherland’s dicta are treated as just that – dicta – Curtiss-Wright and 
Youngstown diverge less on their theories of executive power and more on 
factual differences.  In one, executive policy was grounded in congressional 
authorization and therefore valid (Curtiss-Wright), and in the other, the 
 
208 Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 688 (1981).   
209 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J., 
concurring).   
210 Id. at 635 n.2.   
211 Id.; see also, e.g., Barry E. Carter, International Economic Sanctions: Improving the 
Haphazard U.S. Legal Regime, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 1159, 1244 n.346 (1987); Harold Hongju 
Koh & John C. Yoo, Dollar Diplomacy/Dollar Defense: The Fabric of Economics and 
National Security Law, 26 INT’L LAW. 715, 733 n.74 (1992) (“Thus, Jackson read Curtiss-
Wright not as a constitutional decision, raising the broad ‘question of the President’s power 
to act without congressional authorization,’ but as a case that fell into the first of his three 
categories, involving ‘his right to act under and in accord with an Act of Congress.’” 
(quoting Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 635-36 n.2 (Jackson, J., concurring)); Lawrence M. 
Reich, Foreign Policy or Foreign Commerce?: WTO Accessions and the U.S. Separation of 
Powers, 86 GEO. L.J. 751, 765 n.96 (1998) (“Justice Jackson noted that United States v. 
Curtiss-Wright Export Corp. fell within his first category, because in that case the Court 
upheld a presidential decision prohibiting foreign arms sales that had been endorsed by 
Congress.”).   
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Executive lacked a delegation from the legislature, and was therefore invalid 
(Youngstown).212  And if it is possible to validate Curtiss-Wright on 
Youngstown’s institutional process grounds, precisely as Justice Jackson was 
able to do, Dames & Moore’s statutory approach is less about vindicating 
boundless executive power and more about vindicating a delegation-based 
theory of governance in the national security context.  Indeed, there is plenty of 
room to argue that Dames & Moore is closer to Youngstown than it is to 
Curtiss-Wright. 
While many discussions of national security deference tend to frame the 
relevant doctrinal development through the lens of Curtiss-Wright,213 there are 
a few notable exceptions.  Samuel Issacharoff and Richard Pildes have argued, 
contrary to conventional accounts, that courts resolving complex national 
security cases have historically followed an approach akin to Jackson’s 
Youngstown framework.  As they explain, courts have developed, both in the 
past and the present, “a process-based, institutionally-oriented (as opposed to 
rights-oriented) framework”214 for resolving cases pitting individual rights 
against executive power.  Through these decisions, “courts have sought to shift 
the responsibility . . . toward the joint action of the most democratic branches 
of the government.”215 
 
212 Placed in context, Curtiss-Wright’s constitutional analysis can also be understood 
through the lens of the Court’s general unease with delegations.  Curtiss-Wright was 
decided long before the growth of the modern administrative state and only one year after 
the Supreme Court struck down poultry regulations in A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. 
United States, 295 U.S. 495, 537 (1935), and invalidated the National Industrial Recovery 
Act in Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 433 (1935).  Given the skepticism 
toward administrative delegations, the Court’s decision to constitutionalize executive power 
rather than uphold it as a valid statutory delegation is understandable.  Yet, with the pending 
rise of the administrative state and an increasingly textualist approach to constitutional 
interpretation, courts would begin to rely more squarely on delegations as an important basis 
(if not the sine qua non) for deference in national security cases.   
213 See supra notes 202-06 and accompanying text.  Many scholars who place Dames & 
Moore closer to Curtiss-Wright’s broad theory of plenary executive power note other, 
parallel developments in contemporaneous national security decisions, including the 
extension of political question doctrine during the 1930s and early 1940s, see United States 
v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 231 (1942); United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 330-33 (1937), 
the judicial validation of Executive Branch military commissions, see Johnson v. 
Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 791 (1950); In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 25-26 (1946); Ex parte 
Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 20-21, 28 (1942), dicta in Cold War and post-Cold War decisions that 
Executive Branch interpretations of treaties were entitled to “great weight,” see Kolovrat v. 
Oregon, 366 U.S. 187, 194 (1961), and the further extension of political question doctrine in 
the 1960s, see Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 229 (1962).  For other developments along these 
lines, see Japan Whaling Ass’n v. Am. Cetacean Soc’y, 478 U.S. 221 (1986), Regan v. 
Wald, 468 U.S. 222 (1984), and Weinberger v. Catholic Action of Haw./Peace Educ. 
Project, 454 U.S. 139 (1981). 
214 See Issacharoff & Pildes, supra note 30, at 5.   
215 Id.; see also id. at 9-19;  Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of 
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More recent Supreme Court cases bear out that institutionally oriented 
framework.  As discussed in Part II, in the decade since 9/11, the Supreme 
Court has tended to return to the ordinary administrative law requirement of a 
delegation as a necessary condition of judicial deference.  Despite arguments 
for Curtiss-Wright- or Chevron-style deference, the Court rejected efforts by 
the Executive Branch to read statutory provisions beyond Congress’s likely 
intent.  Hence, while Chevron-backers have argued that courts should “play a 
smaller role . . . in interpreting statutes that touch on foreign relations,”216 the 
Court has met them only part way, “appl[ying] the Youngstown framework in 
deciding critical post-9/11 cases concerning the war on terror.”217  When the 
Executive has been delegated the requisite powers to act, courts have deferred 
to the President.  However, where neither the Constitution nor Congress 
provided the necessary authorization, the Court, following the logic of 
Youngstown and ordinary principles of administrative law, has remanded the 
matter to Congress for a second pass at the question. 
II. YOUNGSTOWN ASCENDANT 
Since 9/11, the Executive Branch has argued on numerous occasions that the 
Supreme Court should defer to its preferred security policies, either because 
the President had inherent Article II powers or because of his authority to read 
congressional statutes broadly.218  But the Court has rejected these arguments, 
 
Parties, Not Powers, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2311, 2350 (2006) (“[C]ourts typically have sought 
to tie the constitutionality of presidential action to the requirement of congressional 
authorization.  When there is sufficiently broad political agreement that both the legislature 
and the Executive endorse a particular liberty-security tradeoff, the courts have generally 
accepted that judgment.  When the Executive has acted without legislative approval, 
however, the courts have applied close scrutiny and, even during wartime, have sometimes 
invalidated those actions.  This process-oriented jurisprudential framework, which finds its 
most eloquent expression in Justice Jackson’s famous concurring opinion in Youngstown, 
dates back at least to the Civil War.”).   
216 See Posner & Sunstein, supra note 1, at 1177.   
217 Levinson & Pildes, supra note 215, at 2350.   
218 See, e.g., Brief for Respondents at 19, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006) 
(No. 05-0184) [hereinafter Hamdan Respondents’ Brief] (“This Court has recognized that 
courts are not competent to second-guess judgments of the political branches regarding the 
extent of force necessary to prosecute a war.”); id. at 18 (arguing that “Article 36 of the 
[Uniform Code of Military Justice] . . . grants the President broad discretion in establishing 
the rules for proceedings before military commissions, expressly providing that the 
President may adopt rules that depart from ‘the principles of law and the rules of evidence 
generally recognized in the trial of criminal cases in the United States district courts,’ when 
‘he considers’ application of those rules to be not ‘practicable’” (quoting 10 U.S.C. § 836(a) 
(2006))); Brief for Respondents at 24 n.9, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004) (No. 03-
6696) (“The determination whether captured enemy combatants are entitled to POW 
privileges under the [Geneva Conventions] is a quintessential matter that the Constitution . . 
. leaves to the political branches and, in particular, the President.”).   
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repeatedly requiring, as a condition of deference, legislative endorsement of 
executive action.  The Court frequently referenced Youngstown as relevant 
authority for its decisions, rejecting the kind of “super-strong” deference 
promoted by Chevron-backers that would collapse national security 
decisionmaking into a single-branch enterprise.  Remarkably, the Court has 
been able to insert itself into the equation without making itself the center of 
attention.  Rather than providing definitive resolutions to questions about the 
scope of individual rights and executive power, the Court has often remanded 
those questions for further deliberation by the political branches. 
A. Rasul and Statutory Habeas 
One week after 9/11, Congress passed the AUMF, a joint resolution 
authorizing President George W. Bush to use all “necessary and appropriate 
force” against those he determined “planned, authorized, committed or aided” 
the September 11, 2001, attacks as well as those who harbored such persons or 
groups.219  In January 2002, as the Bush Administration began to transfer 
individuals for detention at the Guantánamo Bay Naval Base, questions 
surfaced whether the AUMF authorized the President to detain terror suspects 
and try them for war crimes in military commissions.  The Bush 
Administration, relying on its inherent constitutional powers and the language 
of the AUMF, argued that it had broad authority to take necessary action in 
response to the war on terror.220  While the President could plausibly point to 
language within the AUMF that supported his power to take various forms of 
action against members of al-Qaeda and the Taliban, courts refused to grant 
complete deference when he invoked the AUMF to greatly expand his 
authority.  Through its decisions, the Court prevented its national security and 
administrative law doctrines from becoming instruments of wholesale 
deference to the Executive. 
Rasul v. Bush concerned the question whether statutory habeas corpus 
protections applied at Guantánamo Bay.221  The Bush Administration argued 
that any ambiguity regarding the extraterritorial application of the federal 
habeas statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2241, should be construed against the detainees.222  
 
219 See Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001) 
(allowing President George W. Bush “to use all necessary and appropriate force against 
those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or 
aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such 
organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism 
against the United States by such nations, organizations or persons”).  The AUMF was 
followed by a November 13, 2001, Executive Order authorizing executive detention of non-
citizens.  See Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against 
Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833 (Nov. 16, 2001). 
220 Pearlstein, supra note 9, at 804. 
221 Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 470 (2004).   
222 The government noted in its brief that “[s]ince Eisentrager, this Court . . . has 
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It further argued that executive deference had “‘special force when . . . 
construing treaty and statutory provisions that may involve foreign and 
military affairs for which the President has unique responsibility.’”223  The 
President relied on the Supreme Court’s decision in Johnson v. Eisentrager,224 
which denied habeas protections to non-citizens outside U.S. territory.  
Eisentrager and its progeny supplied the Bush Administration with an 
eminently “reasonable” doctrinal basis for its interpretation of the habeas 
statute.225  Still, the Court ruled against the government, holding that the 
detainees could bring petitions because Guantánamo,226 which by contract 
operated under the exclusive “jurisdiction and control” of the United States, 
was a de facto part of U.S. territory.227 
Although Rasul vindicated the detainees’ statutory right to habeas, it was 
not a broad judicial ruling and hardly a model of judicial activism.  The 
majority left undecided many large and important questions regarding the 
content of habeas and what, if any, substantive rights the detainees could 
invoke in their proceedings.228  By leaving these questions to the political 
branches (or, in the absence of legislation, future litigation), Rasul reflects a 
judicial preference for narrow resolutions of cases pitting individual liberty 
against executive power that are neither purely deferential to the Executive nor 
 
repeatedly emphasized its reluctance to presume that Congress intends a federal statute to 
have extraterritorial application.”  Brief for the Respondents at 19, Rasul, 542 U.S. 466 
(Nos. 03-334, 03-343).   
223 Id. (quoting Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 188 (1993) (citing 
United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936))); see also id. (“‘Acts 
of Congress normally do not have extraterritorial application unless such an intent is clearly 
manifested’ . . . .” (quoting Sale, 509 U.S. at 188)).   
224 339 U.S. 763 (1950).  In Eisentrager, the Supreme Court rejected claims brought by 
German citizens who were tried and convicted in military commissions for continuing to 
wage war against the United States after the close of World War II.  Eisentrager held that 
non-citizens located outside the United States were not entitled to bring writs of habeas 
corpus in U.S. courts to challenge their convictions.  Id. at 785.   
225 See, e.g., United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 271-72 (1990) (holding 
that a warrantless search and seizure of a foreign national’s property in Mexico, though 
orchestrated within the United States, was considered to have taken place outside the United 
States and therefore did not amount to a Fourth Amendment violation). 
226 Rasul, 542 U.S. at 483-84.   
227 Id. at 480-84.   
228 Id. at 485 (leaving for further adjudication “[w]hether and what further proceedings 
may become necessary after respondents make their response to the merits of petitioners’ 
claims”); see also Martinez, supra note 11, at 1028 (“In Rasul, the Supreme Court held that 
the federal courts had statutory jurisdiction to hear the habeas corpus petitions filed by 
detainees at the U.S. military base in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, but three years later it was 
still unclear whether those detainees had a constitutional right to habeas or indeed any 
enforceable rights at all.”).   
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purely non-deferential.229  Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,230 decided the same day as 
Rasul, sheds further light on that approach. 
B. Hamdi and Detention 
The Hamdi Court held that although the President had the power to detain, 
possibly indefinitely, Yaser Hamdi, a U.S. citizen who was seized during 
operations in Afghanistan, he retained due process rights to a meaningful 
hearing before a neutral decisionmaker.231  The plurality decision, written by 
Justice O’Connor, upheld the President’s detention authority based on a 
reading of the AUMF that accorded deference to the President’s reasonable 
interpretation of the statutory language while refusing him complete deference 
to expand his authorization beyond the statute’s acceptable limits.  On the one 
hand, the Court held that Hamdi’s detention was proper because it was based 
on the battlefield capture of an individual who was alleged to have fought 
against the United States in an active theater of war.232  As to battlefield 
captures, the AUMF authorized the use of force by the President – and “force” 
reasonably includes the power to detain.233  Yet the Court indicated possible 
limitations on the scope of executive power to detain individuals beyond “the 
 
229 Similarly, four years later, the Court ruled against the government’s arguments for 
broad deference to its interpretation of the habeas statute in a decision that was hardly a 
vindication of the rights of habeas petitioners.  In Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674 (2008), the 
Court held that two U.S. citizens who were accused of committing crimes in Iraq and held 
under international authority by U.S. military personnel acting as part of a multinational 
military coalition could proceed with habeas corpus petitions in the United States.  Id. at 
680.  The men were to be transferred from U.S. to Iraqi custody for prosecution before an 
Iraqi court, and they brought habeas corpus petitions to stop their transfer.  Id. at 681-82.  A 
unanimous Supreme Court held that U.S. citizens located beyond U.S. shores could invoke 
the writ, but the Court denied the petitions on the merits.  Id. at 680.  The Munaf Court, like 
the Rasul Court, had to construe the extraterritoriality of the domestic habeas statute and, 
just as in Rasul, rejected the government’s argument for deference to its interpretation of the 
statute.  The Bush Administration argued that “[t]he exercise of habeas jurisdiction in these 
cases would interfere with the Executive Branch’s international commitments, as well as its 
ability to carry out its military and foreign policy objectives,” see Brief for the Federal 
Parties at 25, Munaf, 553 U.S. 674 (Nos. 07-394, 06-1666), but the Court rejected the 
premise that U.S. citizens held at the behest of U.S. military forces were barred from 
invoking the Writ to challenge their transfer.  The Court observed that “Omar and Munaf are 
American citizens held overseas in the immediate physical custody of American soldiers 
who answer only to an American chain of command.”  Munaf, 553 U.S. at 685 (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  In light of this, the “Government’s argument . . . [was] not easily 
reconciled with the text of § 2241(c)(1).”  Id. at 686.  Although the Court took jurisdiction 
over the case, the ultimate ruling was a defeat for the petitioners, as the Court held that they 
could not invoke habeas to prevent their transfer to Iraq to face prosecution.  Id. at 692. 
230 542 U.S. 507 (2004).   
231 Id. at 521, 533 (plurality opinion). 
232 Id. at 518.   
233 Id.   
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limited category [of detainees] we are considering”234 – i.e., battlefield 
captures.235  As far as the much broader range of individuals being held at 
Guantánamo was concerned, the Court indicated that additional, more 
definitive congressional authorization might be required. 
Rather than ground the President’s detention power within his inherent 
Article II powers, policy expertise, or democratic accountability, the Court 
looked to the President’s reasonable interpretation of a statute – specifically, 
his view that the AUMF’s “use of force” permitted the detention of battlefield 
captures such as Hamdi.236  In finding a statutory basis for the President’s 
detention powers, the plurality rejected carte-blanche presidential authority for 
indefinite detention.  Rather than provide the President broad latitude to 
interpret the AUMF however he wanted, the Court held him to a modest 
reading of the resolution, pointing to implicit durational parameters on those 
powers as well: 
[W]e understand Congress’ grant of authority [in the AUMF] for the use 
of “necessary and appropriate force” to include the authority to detain for 
the duration of the relevant conflict, and our understanding is based on 
longstanding law-of-war principles.  If the practical circumstances of a 
given conflict are entirely unlike those of the conflicts that informed the 
development of the law of war, that understanding may unravel.237 
While the plurality accepted the government’s argument that the AUMF 
incorporated some amount of detention power, the Court implied a 
congressional responsibility to monitor, and update if necessary, the 
President’s detention authority in the wake of ensuing events in the war against 
terror.  
The Hamdi Court was deeply divided, producing four separate opinions 
reflecting a range of different positions regarding the deference owed to the 
 
234 Id.; see also id. at 516 (“We therefore answer only the narrow question before us: 
whether the detention of citizens falling within [the government’s narrow] definition is 
authorized.”); id. at 517 (concluding that the AUMF “is explicit congressional authorization 
for the detention of individuals in the narrow category” of battlefield combatants).  Indeed, 
the government was actually detaining a much broader range of individuals – including 
many who were not captured on the battlefield, not affiliated with al-Qaeda or the Taliban, 
and not involved in the 9/11 terrorist attacks.  The majority in Boumediene left the question 
of the Executive’s broader detention authority undecided as well.  See Boumediene v. Bush, 
553 U.S. 723, 788 (2008) (bracketing questions regarding the propriety of “the indefinite 
detention of ‘enemy combatants’” and “the Department’s definition of enemy combatant”).   
235 The plurality was satisfied that the detention at issue was “so fundamental and 
accepted an incident to war as to be an exercise of the ‘necessary and appropriate force’ 
Congress has authorized the President to use.”  Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 518 (plurality opinion).  
236 The Court recognized that “longstanding law-of-war principles” and international 
“agreement and practice” permit the detention of a combatant to prevent his “return to the 
battlefield,” and that such a power is “a fundamental incident of waging war” falling under 
the larger umbrella of “force” authorized by the AUMF.  See id. at 518-21.   
237 Id. at 521. 
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Executive.  Justice Souter, in a partial concurrence and dissent joined by 
Justice Ginsburg, accepted the premise that Congress could authorize such 
detentions but rejected the plurality’s decision to defer to the President’s 
interpretation of the AUMF.238  Justice Souter argued that the AUMF lacked 
any specific authorizing language legitimizing indefinite detention, and, in the 
absence of more detailed statutory language, Hamdi’s detention violated the 
Non-Detention Act, which requires direct and specific congressional 
authorization to detain U.S. citizens.239  Justice Scalia also dissented, and his 
opinion, joined by Justice Stevens, argued that, absent congressional 
suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, the government would either have to 
charge Hamdi with a crime or release him.240  Only Justice Thomas’s dissent 
accepted the more expansive notion of deference, pressed by the Bush 
Administration, that the President possessed inherent authority to detain a wide 
range of individuals with a more attenuated (if any) connection to the 9/11 
attacks.  Justice Thomas invoked Curtiss-Wright’s apparent support for the 
notion that the President should be “free from interference” by the Court on 
questions involving national security.241  For Thomas, Hamdi’s “detention 
[fell] squarely within the Federal Government’s war powers, and we lack the 
expertise and capacity to second-guess that decision.”242 
The Hamdi plurality, having upheld detention, next decided what, if any, 
due process rights it would accord U.S. citizen “enemy combatant” detainees.  
Here, again, the Court rejected the government’s request for deference by 
refusing to credit a two-page affidavit the government supplied that purported 
to demonstrate Hamdi’s affiliations with a Taliban unit captured by Northern 
Alliance forces in Afghanistan.243  The government argued that the Court 
should accept the contents of the affidavit under a minimal level of judicial 
review – the deferential “some evidence” standard – which the government 
asserted was the appropriate test for evaluating the government’s proof of 
Hamdi’s alleged terrorist connections.244  While the plurality accepted a range 
of other government-friendly procedural regimes – including a rebuttable 
presumption in favor of the government’s evidence, the use of hearsay, and the 
 
238 Id. at 541 (Souter, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part, and concurring in the 
judgment). 
239 See id. at 542-46 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a) (2000)).  According to Justice Souter, 
the AUMF “never so much as uses the word detention, and there is no reason to think 
Congress might have perceived any need to augment Executive power to deal with 
dangerous citizens within the United States” beyond the “the well-stocked statutory arsenal 
of defined criminal offenses covering the gamut of actions that a citizen sympathetic to 
terrorists might commit.”  Id. at 547. 
240 Id. at 573 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
241 Id. at 581-82 (Thomas, J., dissenting).   
242 Id. at 579.   
243 Id. at 526-28, 537 (plurality opinion).   
244 Id. at 527.   
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use of non-Article III tribunals – it rejected the government’s proffered “some 
evidence” standard as “extreme,”245 stating that “[a]ny process in which the 
Executive’s factual assertions go wholly unchallenged or are simply presumed 
correct without any opportunity for the alleged combatant to demonstrate 
otherwise falls constitutionally short.”246  Citing Youngstown, the Court noted 
that the government’s position would “serve[] only to condense power into a 
single branch of government,” and that the ongoing “state of war is not a blank 
check for the President when it comes to the rights of the Nation’s citizens.”247 
C. Hamdan and Military Commissions 
After the 2004 Rasul and Hamdi decisions, Congress attempted to reverse 
Rasul by stripping federal court jurisdiction over statutory habeas claims in the 
Detainee Treatment Act (DTA).248  The DTA permits detainees to seek limited 
review in the D.C. Circuit to challenge decisions by (1) Combatant Status 
Review Tribunals (CSRTs), which determined the propriety of one’s detention 
at Guantánamo,249 and (2) military commissions, which determined a 
detainee’s guilt.250  Under that “DTA Review” process, the D.C. Circuit would 
consider whether the Executive followed its own standards and procedures and 
whether the procedures were consistent with the Constitution (assuming it 
applies at Guantánamo).251  From a certain perspective, this review 
mechanism, which mirrors the Hobbs Act by creating procedures for the 
review of a final Executive Branch decision in a federal court of appeals, 
places a layer of administrative law review over the Guantánamo 
proceedings.252   
 
245 See id. at 527, 535-36.   
246 Id. at 537.   
247 See id.   
248 Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub L. No. 109-148, § 1005(e)(1), 119 Stat. 2739, 
2741-43 (amending 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (2000)).   
249 After Boumediene restored habeas corpus review, the D.C. Circuit held detainees 
could no longer avail themselves of the judicial review provisions of the DTA and would 
henceforth be required to proceed through habeas corpus petitions in district court.  
Bismullah v. Gates, 551 F.3d 1068, 1072-73, 1075 (D.C. Cir. 2009). 
250 Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 § 1005(e)(2)-(3).  
251 Id.  With regard to CSRT determinations, the D.C. Circuit could consider (1) whether 
any particular CSRT “was consistent with the standards and procedures” put in place by the 
Defense Department at Guantánamo, and (2) “to the extent the Constitution and laws of the 
United States are applicable, whether the use of such standards and procedures to make the 
determination is consistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States.”  Id. § 
1005(e)(2)(C).  As far as military commissions are concerned, the D.C. Circuit could 
consider whether (1) “the final decision was consistent with the [government’s] standards 
and procedures” and (2) “to the extent the Constitution and laws of the United States are 
applicable, whether the use of such standards and procedures to reach the final decision is 
consistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States.”  Id. § 1005(e)(3)(D).   
252 The Hobbs Act, Pub. L. No. 87-301, § 106, 75 Stat. 650, 651-53 (1961), which 
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In Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, the Court first held that habeas remained available 
for individuals, such as Hamdan, who filed habeas petitions prior to the 
enactment of the DTA.253  Hamdan sought to challenge the legality of the 
military commission used to try him, and the government moved to dismiss the 
suit on the grounds that the DTA manifested a clear intent on the part of 
Congress to eliminate district court habeas jurisdiction over all claims filed by 
Guantánamo detainees – including those already pending in federal court.254  
However, the Hamdan Court, interpreting the DTA, held that the text of the 
statute, which replaced habeas corpus with a limited form of judicial review 
within the D.C. Circuit, did not strip habeas jurisdiction for cases pending at 
the time the DTA went into effect.255  As to Hamdan’s habeas petition (and 
petitions by others who, like Hamdan, filed prior to the enactment of the 
DTA), habeas corpus proceedings could proceed. 
Reaching the issue of the commissions’ legality, the Court refused to grant 
the President’s use of military commissions the same deference it would 
accord an ordinary administrative agency, and the difference may have been 
due to the lack of congressional endorsement of the Guantánamo tribunals.  
After all, while the DTA created a statutory judicial review mechanism, it did 
not actually create the tribunals or expressly delegate the President authority to 
do so.  It merely spelled out the D.C. Circuit’s limited review mechanism of 
the President’s CSRTs and military commissions.  This explains Hamdan’s 
more skeptical approach toward the government’s argument that military 
commissions were a creature of statute.  The Court rejected the government’s 
proffered statutory bases for the President’s military commissions at 
Guantánamo, finding that neither the AUMF,256 nor the DTA,257 nor the 
 
governs review of decisions by other administrative agencies, places appellate review 
exclusively in the courts of appeals.   
253 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 576-85 (2006).   
254 Id. at 574. 
255 Id. at 584.   
256 The Court refused to treat the AUMF as a framework statute triggering broad and vast 
agency-style powers to establish a system of military commissions outside the procedures 
already prescribed in the Uniform Code of Military Justice.  While “the AUMF activated the 
President’s war powers, and [] those powers include the authority to convene military 
commissions in appropriate circumstances, there is nothing in the text or legislative history 
of the AUMF even hinting that Congress intended to expand or alter the authorization set 
forth in Article 21 of the UCMJ.”  Id. at 594 (citations omitted). 
257 The Court rejected the government’s attempt to equate recognition of military 
commissions with their authorization, noting that “[t]he DTA obviously ‘recognize[s]’ the 
existence of the Guantanamo Bay commissions in the weakest sense because it references 
some of the military orders governing them and creates limited judicial review of their ‘final 
decision[s].’”  Id. (alterations in original) (citations omitted) (quoting Hamdan Respondents’ 
Brief, supra note 218, at 15; Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 § 1005(e)(3)).  However, “the 
DTA cannot be read to authorize this commission.  Although the DTA . . . was enacted after 
the President had convened Hamdan’s commission, it contains no language authorizing that 
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Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ)258 provided the necessary statutory 
mandate.  Absent clear authorization from Congress, the commissions could 
not proceed.259  In that sense, Hamdan, like Hamdi, noted the need for a clearer 
expression of statutory authority as a basis for broad deference. 
Although the Court rejected all bases supplied by the Bush Administration 
as authorization for its commissions, four Justices specifically noted that 
Congress could authorize them via statute.  In perhaps the clearest articulation 
of this point, Justice Kennedy pointed out in his concurrence that Congress 
could, “after due consideration,” alter the law if it were to “deem[] it 
appropriate to change the controlling statutes.”260  Justice Breyer also noted in 
his concurrence that “[n]othing prevents the President from returning to 
Congress to seek the authority he believes necessary.”261  These opinions 
reinforce the importance of congressional delegations, both during times of 
heightened national security as well as during ordinary circumstances. 
Justice Kennedy’s Hamdan concurrence relies specifically on Jackson’s 
Youngstown framework,262 articulating the importance of congressional 
backing such “that when military tribunals are established, full and proper 
authority exists for the Presidential directive.”263  For Kennedy, these 
delegations are not only important in their own right, but serve to reflect more 
deliberative norms that inhere to the lawmaking process.  As he explains: 
Where a statute provides the conditions for the exercise of governmental 
power, its requirements are the result of a deliberative and reflective 
process engaging both of the political branches.  Respect for laws derived 
from the customary operation of the Executive and Legislative Branches 
gives some assurance of stability in time of crisis.  The Constitution is 
 
tribunal or any other at Guantanamo Bay.”  Id. 
258 The Court held that the procedures used in military commissions at Guantánamo had 
to be consistent with the dictates of the UCMJ, with exceptions only in cases where “such 
uniformity proves impracticable.”  Id. at 620.  The Court rejected the President’s 
“‘practicability’ determination . . . [as] insufficient to justify variances from the procedures 
governing courts-martial.”  Id. at 622.  The Court noted two separate “practicability” 
determinations, and while it assumed it owed “complete deference” to the President’s 
determination not to apply the rules of criminal cases to military commissions under 10 
U.S.C. § 836(a), it refused to defer to the President’s position regarding the second 
practicability requirement, requiring the use of courts-martial procedures unless 
impracticable.  Id. at 622-23 (“Nothing in the record before us demonstrates that it would be 
impracticable to apply court-martial rules in this case.”). 
259 Id. at 594-95.   
260 Id. at 637 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part).  
261 Id. at 636 (Breyer, J., concurring).   
262 Id. at 638 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part) (“The proper framework for assessing 
whether executive actions are authorized is the three-part scheme used by Justice Jackson in 
his opinion in Youngstown  Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 578 (1952).”).   
263 Id.   
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best preserved by reliance on standards tested over time and insulated 
from the pressures of the moment.264 
Congress did not fail to heed the Court’s call for a statutory delegation.  
Within a few months of Hamdan, it passed the Military Commissions Act 
(MCA),265 which created a framework statute for military commissions.266  
While the Supreme Court has yet to consider the legitimacy of these newly 
created military commissions, one lower court upheld them after passage of the 
MCA.267  Once Congress had authorized the commissions, the government 
brought a new trial against Hamdan, who challenged the legality of the 
commission by seeking injunctive relief in federal court.  Judge Robertson, 
who had initially granted Hamdan’s writ of habeas corpus in the case that 
reached the Supreme Court,268 refused to put a stop to the commissions once 
they had a basis in legislation.269  Although Judge Robertson expressed 
concerns about the constitutionality of the commissions’ procedures, including 
the codification of crimes that were not unlawful at the time Hamdan 
committed them, he deferred to the commission system Congress had put in 
place, noting the “significant improvements” codified by the MCA.270  Hence, 
in the wake of the MCA, at least one federal judge who had previously put a 
stop to a military commission, and whose ruling was largely upheld by the 
Supreme Court in Hamdan, was now prepared to let that commission proceed.  
In that significant case, Congress’s legislative response supplied the basis for 
judicial deference. 
D. Boumediene and Executive Branch Procedures at Guantánamo 
In addition to providing statutory authorization for Guantánamo military 
commissions, the MCA amended the habeas corpus statute to eliminate federal 
 
264 Id. at 637; see also Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 738 (2008) (describing the 
clear-statement requirement as an “interpretive rule [that] facilitates a dialogue between 
Congress and the Court”).   
265 Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600.   
266 10 U.S.C. § 948a-m (2006).   
267 Hamdan v. Gates, 565 F. Supp. 2d 130 (D.D.C. 2008).   
268 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 344 F. Supp. 2d 152 (D.D.C. 2004).  Judge Robertson’s 2004 
ruling striking down the military commissions was vindicated by the Supreme Court in 
Hamdan.   
269 Hamdan, 565 F. Supp. 2d at 136.   
270 Id. at 132 (citing 10 U.S.C. §§ 949d(b), (e) (2006)).  On October 16, 2012, the D.C. 
Circuit vacated Hamdan’s conviction for material support for terrorism.  Hamdan v. United 
States, 696 F.3d 1238, 1240 (D.C. Cir. 2012).  Taking note of “a serious Ex Post Facto 
Clause issue,” id. at 1241, the court interpreted the Military Commissions Act not to 
retroactively punish new crimes and found that Hamdan’s conviction for material support 
for terrorism could not stand because material support for terrorism was not a crime triable 
by military commission under U.S. law at the time the conduct occurred. 
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jurisdiction over claims brought by detainees.271  After the MCA’s enactment, 
the review mechanisms in the D.C. Circuit created by the DTA272 were the sole 
mechanism for challenging detention decisions and judgments by military 
commissions.  While some detainees invoked the DTA review mechanism to 
challenge their classification as enemy combatants, others pressed the 
argument that the MCA worked an unconstitutional suspension of the 
constitutional Writ of Habeas Corpus, a question the Supreme Court 
considered in Boumediene v. Bush.273  In Boumediene, the Supreme Court held, 
first, that the Constitution’s Suspension Clause applied at Guantánamo Bay274 
and, second, that the judicial review procedures created by the DTA regarding 
CSRT detention determinations275 were an inadequate substitute for habeas 
corpus.276 
In one sense, the policies challenged by the Boumediene detainees were the 
product of joint political branch decisionmaking.277  After all, the jurisdiction-
stripping provisions of the MCA were consistent with, if not a full 
endorsement of, the Bush Administration’s litigation position that Guantánamo 
detainees lacked access to habeas corpus rights.  In a deeper sense, however, 
political branch agreement may have been more apparent than real.  Pre-
Boumediene decisions required that Congress and the President do more than 
merely assent to the same proposition.  Rather, the Supreme Court’s decisions 
in cases such as Hamdi and Hamdan spoke of the need for authorizing 
legislation, if not a comprehensive framework, for enemy combatant status 
tribunals and military commissions.  Such lack of statutory authorization 
became apparent immediately before and during the Boumediene oral 
argument, when the government, in an apparent attempt to persuade the Court 
to uphold the DTA process as an adequate replacement for habeas, pressed a 
reading of the DTA’s judicial review provisions that seemed to contradict the 
plain terms of the statute. 
 
271 Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, § 7(a), 120 Stat. 2600, 
2635-36 (amending 28 U.S.C. § 2241(e) (2006)). 
272 See supra notes 249-51 and accompanying text. 
273 553 U.S. 723 (2008).   
274 Id. at 771.   
275 See supra notes 249-51 and accompanying text.    
276 Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 787-92.  Although the government may create alternative 
mechanisms to habeas, any replacement would have to be an “adequate and effective 
substitute.”  The Court reviewed the mechanisms provided by the DTA and, finding them 
lacking, restored district court habeas as the appropriate mechanism for reviewing claims 
that detainees were improperly held at Guantánamo.  Id. at 798. 
277 Id. at 801 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“Today the Court strikes down as inadequate the 
most generous set of procedural protections ever afforded aliens detained by this country as 
enemy combatants.  The political branches crafted these procedures amidst an ongoing 
military conflict, after much careful investigation and thorough debate. . . .  The majority 
merely replaces a review system designed by the people's representatives with a set of 
shapeless procedures to be defined by federal courts at some future date.”). 
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While the MCA did supply a framework creating military commissions, 
there was no indication within that statute, other than its jurisdiction-stripping 
language, of an explicit endorsement of the CSRT process governing the 
detention and status determinations of enemy combatants.  Hence, while the 
government tried to argue that the judicial review mechanisms of the DTA 
were the product of precisely the type of deliberative process between the 
political branches that the Court had required in prior decisions,278 it was 
unclear whether Congress had ever considered – much less validated through a 
considered debate – the propriety of the CSRTs. 
Despite the government’s effort to establish before the Court that the MCA 
reflected a joint political branch decision, it remained the case that Congress 
had not explicitly endorsed the CSRT review procedures (or delegated the 
executive power to act in the first place).  Another problem for the government 
was that, by the time of Boumediene, the Court had abundant evidence of flaws 
in the government’s implementation of the process it created for reviewing 
enemy combatant determinations.  It became clear during the DTA litigation 
that the formalized process to review the combatant status of enemy combatant 
detainees at Guantánamo had not been implemented according to the 
Government’s plan.279  Retired Rear Admiral James M. McGarrah, who served 
as Director of the Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of 
Enemy Combatants (OARDEC)280 for nearly two years, testified that the 
Guantánamo tribunals, which were supposed to review “reasonably available 
information in the possession of the U.S. government”281 through the 
assistance of the “Recorder” – a military officer282 charged with obtaining and 
 
278 Citing the Court’s prior rulings, the government argued that the MCA and DTA 
“represent[ed] an effort by the political branches to strike an appropriate balance between 
the need to preserve liberty and the need to accommodate ‘the weighty and sensitive 
governmental interests in ensuring that those who have in fact fought with the enemy during 
a war do not return to battle against the United States.’  And the laws reflect precisely the 
kind of consultation between the President and Congress that ‘strengthens the Nation’s 
ability to determine – through democratic means – how best’ to confront national security 
threats during an ongoing military conflict.”  Brief for Respondents at 10-11, Boumediene 
(Nos. 06-1195, 06-1196) (quoting Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 636 (2006) (Breyer, 
J., concurring); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 531 (2004)) (internal citations omitted). 
279 See, e.g., Bismullah v. Gates, 514 F.3d 1291, 1295 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (citing the 
Declarations of James M. McGarrah, Rear Admiral (Retired), U.S. Navy, and Stephen 
Abraham, Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army Reserve, which describe the procedural 
deficiencies in the CSRTs at Guantánamo).  
280 OARDEC’s mission was to prepare for and conduct the CSRT hearings, for which it 
had a staff of more than 200.  Declaration of James M. McGarrah, Rear Admiral (Retired), 
U.S. Navy ¶ 2, Bismullah v. Gates, 501 F.3d 178 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (Nos. 06-1197, 06-1397). 
281 See Memorandum from the Sec’y of the Navy Gordon England, enclosure 1, § E(3) 
(July 29, 2004) [hereinafter England Memorandum] (available at http://www.defense.gov/ne 
ws/jul2004/d20040730comb.pdf).  
282 Under the Department of Defense’s standards and practices, the Recorder was a 
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reviewing the relevant evidence possessed by the various agencies and 
supplying that information, along with exculpatory evidence, to the tribunals283 
– did not consider the entire scope of agency materials that were available.284  
Stephen Abraham, a Lieutenant Colonel in the U.S. Army Reserve who 
participated in the operation of the CSRT process as a member of OARDEC, 
confirmed these irregularities.285  His testimony pointed to serious gaps in the 
entire evidence-gathering process at Guantánamo and to pressures placed on 
OARDEC leadership and other officials to validate “enemy combatant” 
determinations, regardless of the merits.286  In addition to these deficiencies in 
evidence gathering, detainees were routinely denied access to many of the 
promised procedures that would allow them to prepare a defense.287 
 
military officer and an attorney who is appointed to obtain and present all relevant evidence 
to the CSRT and prepare the CSRT record.  Id., enclosure 1, § C(2). 
283 The Recorder aided the Tribunal’s creation of a record of the proceedings by 
canvassing evidence from all federal agencies, culling through that information (known as 
the “government information”) for inculpatory and exculpatory evidence, and providing 
each CSRT panel with that portion of the government information that was relevant to each 
detainee’s status as an enemy combatant (known as the “government evidence”).  England 
Memorandum, supra note 281, enclosure 1, §§ (C)(2), H(4); id. enclosure 2, §§ B(1), C(1), 
C(6).  
284 See Declaration of Rear Admiral (Retired) James M. McGarrah, supra note 280, ¶¶ 
10-13.  Rather than consider the full scope of available information, the Recorder limited the 
inquiry to certain Defense Department and military databases and, within those databases, 
excluded certain additional information due to its “sensitivity.”  It also turned out that much 
of the Recorder’s work was farmed out to a team of lower-level contractors who appeared to 
lack the requisite expertise to cull the relevant information.  See id. ¶¶ 4, 12, 13 (noting that, 
beginning September 1, 2004, the Recorder did not “personally collect[] the Government 
Information”; withheld from the tribunals exculpatory information if in its view it was 
“duplicative” or “if it did not relate to a specific allegation being made against the detainee”; 
and, contrary to Defense Department policy, did not actually draft the unclassified summary 
of the evidence). 
285 See generally Declaration of Stephen Abraham, Bismullah, 501 F.3d 178 (Nos. 06-
1197, 06-1397). 
286 See id. ¶¶ 5-24.  He also testified that “on a number of occasions” his request that an 
originating agency provide “a written statement that there was no exculpatory evidence . . . 
[was] summarily denied”; that the people “preparing materials for use by the CSRT board 
members did not know whether they had examined all available information or even why 
they possessed some pieces of information but not others”; that “the case writer or Recorder, 
without proper experience or a basis for giving context to information, often rejected some 
information arbitrarily while accepting other information without any articulable rationale”; 
and that the case writers did not have access to the most updated and relevant intelligence.  
See id. ¶¶ 12, 16, 17, 18. 
287 See Mark Denbeaux & Joshua W. Denbeaux, No-Hearing Hearings: CSRT: The 
Modern Habeas Corpus? 2-3 (Seton Hall Law Sch., Pub. Law & Legal Research Paper No. 
951245, 2006), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=951245. 
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While these procedural irregularities may have supplied an important basis 
for the Court’s willingness to consider the Boumediene case and, eventually, 
replace the flawed system at Guantánamo with Article III habeas courts,288 it 
was the unilateral nature of the tribunals that sealed their doom.  The CSRTs 
were not a creature of statute, and the very narrow judicial procedures 
Congress did create provided an insufficient substitute for a habeas court.  
Congress provided no explicit mechanism – through habeas or otherwise – 
through which a federal court could order the release of a wrongfully held 
detainee.  Hence, the Boumediene majority’s concern that “congressional 
silence” regarding “most, if not all, of the legal claims [the petitioners sought] 
to advance, including their most basic claim: that the President has no authority 
under the AUMF to detain them indefinitely” left it to the Bush Administration 
to resort to a single-branch solution for the Guantánamo procedures.289  From 
this perspective, the government’s efforts to breathe new life into the DTA by 
suggesting a more detainee-friendly interpretation of the statute, including the 
suggestion that the DTA implicitly provided for “a remedy of release,”290 
misjudged the Court’s broader concern with the lack of institutional buy-in 
from Congress.  Giving “proper deference . . . to the political branches”291 
required that the Court not accept the government’s last-ditch effort to trumpet 
a broad interpretation of the judicial review provisions of the DTA nowhere 
contained within the statute.  The Boumediene Court rejected this single-
branch approach to resolving the complicated matter of enemy combatant 
designations.292  Having remanded the issue to Congress without success, the 
Court restored habeas corpus review in Article III courts. 
III. GUARDING CHEVRON’S BORDERS IN NATIONAL SECURITY LAW 
Chevron-backers, as one might expect, lament the past decade’s lack of 
“super-strong” deference to the Executive.  Posner and Sunstein argue that 
“Hamdan [wa]s simply wrong”293 and that Justice Thomas’s dissent, which 
“reli[ed] on the principle of executive deference, based on the President’s 
institutional advantages, is very much in the spirit of our argument that foreign 
relations should be Chevronized.”294  Similarly, John Yoo and Julian Ku, in 
 
288 See Joseph Landau, Muscular Procedure: Conditional Deference in the Executive 
Detention Cases, 84 WASH. L. REV. 661, 694 (2009) (“Boumediene . . . restored collateral 
review for a procedurally defective DTA process within the more trusted institution of 
federal habeas courts.”).   
289 Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 788 (2008) (emphasis added). 
290 Id.   
291 Id. at 796.   
292 Cf. Pearlstein, supra note 9, at 806 n.118 (“One most easily reads Justice Kennedy[ in 
Boumediene] as understanding the deference obligation to go to Congress and the President 
– not to the executive alone.”).   
293 Posner & Sunstein, supra note 1, at 1225.   
294 Id. at 1225 n.181; see also Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 716-20 (2006) 
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their article promoting Chevron deference in national security, argue that “the 
executive’s interpretations of the UCMJ provisions [in Hamdan] deserved 
substantial deference under the Chevron doctrine”295 and that such “non-
deference . . . is the most surprising and disturbing aspect of the Court’s 
decision.”296  But the suggestion that 9/11 ushered in a renewed assertion of 
judicial non-deference mischaracterizes the import of these rulings.  After all, 
the decisions leave unanswered as many questions (if not far more) than they 
resolve – including matters such as the content of individual rights and scope 
of executive power during times of emergency.  At the same time, the rulings 
reflect a taming of Chevron consistent with its interpretation in the domestic 
context.  By guarding Chevron’s borders,297 the Court has preserved its 
relevance to the national security context.   
A. 9/11 and Political Branch Deliberation 
The Supreme Court’s post-9/11 decisions, taken as a whole, promote the 
norm of political branch deliberation by vindicating Executive Branch policy 
authorized by statutory law and rebuffing Executive Branch policies lacking 
congressional authorization.  In Hamdi, for example, the Court accepted 
constraints on individual liberty provided they were grounded within a statute.  
The Court interpreted the AUMF to place few limitations on the President’s 
authority to detain a U.S. citizen alleged to have been captured on the 
battlefield in Afghanistan.298  At the same time, the Court rejected an 
expansive interpretation of presidential authority to detain a broader category 
of individuals, including those who were not battlefield captures, indicating 
that it might require Congress to authorize those additional powers before the 
Court would be in a position to validate them.     
Hamdan promoted the same norm by refusing to accept military 
commissions that were the product of a single branch.299  In addition to the 
Court’s concerns about a lack of horizontal deliberation, commentators have 
noted that the commissions also suffered from an absence of deliberation 
 
(Thomas, J., dissenting).   
295 Ku & Yoo, supra note 1, at 196.   
296 Id. at 180; see also id. at 194 (arguing that “Justice Stevens’s opinion [in Hamdan] 
barely acknowledges the existence or relevance of [deference] doctrines much less justify 
his departure from them.”).   
297 Negusie v. Holder, 555 U.S. 511, 531 (2009) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part) (“The fact that Congress has left a gap for the agency to fill means that 
courts should defer to the agency’s reasonable gap-filling decisions, not that courts should 
cease to mark the bounds of delegated agency choice.”). 
298 See supra Part II.B.; see also Levinson & Pildes, supra note 215, at 2350 (“[Hamdi] 
rested on the conclusion, under the Youngstown framework, that Congress had authorized 
executive detention in such circumstances in the 2001 [AUMF].”). 
299 See supra Part II.C; see also Katyal, supra note 32, at 97 (observing that the Hamdan 
Court rejected the government’s argument “that the President’s interpretations of statutory 
and treaty law were entitled to extreme deference”).   
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within the administrative arms of the Executive Branch.  As Neal Katyal has 
pointed out, the “[Bush] Administration, when it designed the commissions, 
ignored Secretary of State Colin Powell and National Security Adviser 
Condoleezza Rice and their staffs.  It was also well known that the commission 
plan was pushed through over the disagreement of members of the military’s 
top brass.”300  Hence, Hamdan can be understood not only as a rejection of 
presidential action without congressional authorization, but also of “executive 
action taken without the prior involvement of experts.”301  From this 
perspective, the problem with the commissions stemmed from a vertical 
deliberation deficit when internal Bush Administration experts were not 
consulted or given sufficient attention. 
Boumediene also provides an example of the Court’s emphasis on dual-
branch solutions to national security policy.  During the litigation, the Bush 
Administration offered the Supreme Court an interpretation of the DTA that 
was considerably more detainee-friendly than what it had advanced in the 
lower courts.302  But that interpretation – including the argument that the 
DTA’s exceedingly limited judicial review provisions somehow allowed for 
judicial invalidation of the government’s enemy combatant determinations – 
strained any fair reading of the statute and could not be squared with (or fill a 
gap created by) Congress’s silence.  From the standpoint of Jackson’s 
Youngstown concurrence, the government’s civil-libertarian reading of the 
DTA was an illustration of the President acting at his “lowest ebb” of power by 
pressing a reading of a statute – albeit in the hope of salvaging it – that 
undermined its purpose.  The Boumediene Court, following Youngstown, 
refused to credit the Solicitor General’s eleventh-hour attempt to persuade the 
Court to adopt a generous interpretation of the DTA that conflicted with 
congressional intent, even if such a reading was the only way to preserve the 
constitutionality of the MCA’s stripping of habeas corpus.303 
The failure of political branch deliberation is also evident in Boumediene’s 
treatment of Congress’s efforts to strip habeas jurisdiction in the MCA.  After 
Hamdan’s methodical interpretation of the DTA, including the Court’s 
determination that habeas jurisdiction remained available for those detainees 
who brought their habeas petitions prior to the passage of the statute, 
 
300 See Katyal, supra note 32, at 109; see also id. at 110 (noting the strong opposition by 
experts to the Administration’s interpretation of Common Article 3 of the Geneva 
Conventions). 
301 Id. at 109. 
302 See supra note 290 and accompanying text; see also Transcript of Oral Argument at 
37, Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008) (Nos. 06-1195, 06-1196) (“[I]f what the 
Constitution requires to make the DTA to be an adequate substitute is the power to order 
release, there is no obstacle in the text of the DTA to that.”); id. at 52-53 (arguing that, 
under the DTA, detainees could challenge the breadth of the definition of “enemy 
combatant”).    
303 Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 788. 
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Congress’s response fell flat.  While one could argue that, by simply cutting 
off judicial review altogether, Congress did something, the Court saw 
“[n]othing in [Hamdan that could] be construed as an invitation for Congress 
to suspend the writ.”304  Congress’s decision merely to eliminate federal 
jurisdiction, rather than actually create a procedural system that was the 
product of joint political branch input, undermined “[t]he usual presumption [] 
that Members of Congress, in accord with their oath of office, considered the 
constitutional issue and determined the amended statute to be a lawful one.”305  
Its lack of involvement in creating any alternative mechanism for the 
Guantánamo detention tribunals seemed to contradict “the care Congress ha[d] 
taken throughout our Nation’s history to preserve the writ and its function.”306  
B.  Congressional Remands After 9/11 
Once the post-9/11 decisions are understood through the lens of the Court’s 
preference for dual-branch solutions to national security problems, Chevron’s 
absence becomes more understandable.  Rather than adopt a default rule of 
deference to reasonable Executive Branch interpretations of statutes that do not 
actually delegate power to the Executive to act with the force of law, the Court 
has required collective political branch assessment of the underlying merits of 
the Executive’s preferred policies.  In this way, the Court has attempted, 
whenever possible, to elevate presidential decisionmaking from Youngstown 
Category Two to Category One.307  But the political branches have not always 
responded to the Court’s overtures.  While the AUMF speaks only generally to 
a use of force against al-Qaeda and the Taliban,308 it has served as the primary 
statutory basis for the Executive Branch’s policymaking regarding domestic 
and international detention, surveillance, and military commissions.  Yet, the 
AUMF provides at best vague indications of the President’s national security 
powers and little clarity on questions such as the definition of those persons the 
President may detain at Guantánamo, the length of those detentions, the 
conditions of those detentions, and the substantive rights and remedies 
cognizable in habeas challenges.  While courts have resolved subsidiary 
elements of these questions, the Supreme Court has mainly adopted a policy of 
 
304 Id. at 735. 
305 Id. at 738.   
306 Id. at 773. 
307 See Levinson & Pildes, supra note 215, at 2355-56 (“If courts were less inclined to 
read ambiguous legislation as affirmative authorizations of executive action, the President 
would be forced to press Congress to address the merits of the administration’s antiterrorism 
strategy.  A default rule against latitudinous interpretations in support of executive power 
during unified government could be an action-forcing mechanism to press . . . Congress to 
share responsibility for these difficult choices – or at least give them a serious airing.”).   
308 See supra note 219 and accompanying text. 
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remanding these questions to Congress for clarification through statutory 
delegations, and Congress has generally avoided those calls.309   
While the resulting statutes contain some important procedural 
improvements,310 Congress has generally refrained from legislating on 
numerous other matters concerning Executive Branch national security powers.  
Hamdan’s requirement for a clear legislative mandate authorizing the 
President’s commissions led to a “quick and inevitably messy quilting bee in 
Congress” culminating in the MCA.311  The most recent National Defense 
Authorization Act, which addresses a few of the questions raised by the 
Guantánamo litigation, leaves the lion’s share of those matters unanswered.312  
Because Congress, when it has acted, generally has done so through broad, 
vague, and at times sweeping national security legislation, often with little 
debate and with few (if any) indications of the limits of executive 
implementation,313 a number of important issues have been left for judicial 
development.314   
 
309 See BENJAMIN WITTES, ROBERT CHESNEY & RABEA BENHALIM, BROOKINGS INST., THE 
EMERGING LAW OF DETENTION: THE GUANTÁNAMO HABEAS CASES AS LAWMAKING 1 (2010), 
available at 
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/papers/2010/0122_guantanamo_wittes_chesney/
0122_guantanamo_wittes_chesney.pdf (“Congress could have legislated with respect to 
these questions and sought to define the rules, but it has not done so to date.”).   
310 Those improvements include the following procedural enhancements in military 
commissions:  (1) military judges preside at trials; (2) ex parte evidence is not permitted; (3) 
evidence extracted through torture or other coercive treatment is excluded; and (4) appeals 
from the commissions can be taken first to the D.C. Circuit and, eventually, the Supreme 
Court.  See Military Commissions Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-84, §§ 1802-1804, 123 Stat. 
2190, 2574-614 (amending scattered sections of 10 U.S.C.); Military Commissions Act of 
2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600.   
311 See Katyal, supra note 32, at 106; id. at 84-85 (“Working with allies in Congress, the 
President [] pushed through legislation that attempted to divest or delay federal jurisdiction 
over cases brought from Guantánamo Bay.  This legislation was introduced and passed in 
the days following the Court’s grant of certiorari in Hamdan, and the Solicitor General used 
it as the basis of his motion to dismiss the case from the Supreme Court.” (footnote 
omitted)).      
312 See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-81, 
125 Stat. 1298.  With the exception of one key provision affirming the President’s detention 
authority, id. § 1021(a), the legislation provides little clarity regarding many of the issues 
courts have struggled to address in a decade’s worth of Guantánamo litigation.  Other 
provisions of the legislation only create tension between Congress and the President by 
explicitly forbidding the latter from transferring Guantánamo detainees for continued 
confinement in the United States or repatriating detainees to the United States.  Id. §§ 1026, 
1027. 
313 Katyal, supra note 32, at 115 (“Instead of engaging in a sober debate about the 
meaning of constitutional text, history, and precedent, Congress rushed the MCA through 
without much thought to the constitutional consequences.  Congress hoped, as Senator 
Specter memorably put it, that despite the MCA’s ‘patently unconstitutional’ provisions, the 
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It should be noted that, since 9/11, Congress has not refrained from enacting 
detailed framework statutes when it wants to do so.  After Hamdan, Congress 
authorized military commissions,315 and at least one court that had initially 
rejected the commissions approved them after Congress acted.316  Other post-
9/11 statutes, such as the USA PATRIOT Act, also speak clearly and 
specifically to national security detention issues by, for example, prescribing 
clear limits to Executive Branch detention authority in the absence of formal 
criminal charges or the initiation of removal proceedings.317  Notably, those 
provisions have so far survived constitutional scrutiny.318  But in the post-9/11 
arena, clear delegations to the President have been lacking, and the kind of 
“super-strong” deference championed by Chevron-backers has consequently 
been absent. 
C. Chevron’s Detractors 
While the Supreme Court has rejected Executive Branch decisions lacking 
in congressional endorsement, the rulings do not necessarily validate the view 
of those who reject the idea of Executive Branch deference where national 
security is concerned.  For scholars such as Deborah Pearlstein, Jenny 
Martinez, David Cole, and Martin Flaherty, courts should resolve rights 
questions at the core of national security disputes by articulating bright-line 
rules regarding the scope of individual liberty on questions concerning 
detention, conditions of confinement, surveillance, military commissions, 
renditions, and the like.319  Some of these scholars argue, further, that the post-
9/11 decisions, while not going far enough to protect the principles of liberty at 
stake, nonetheless demonstrate a commitment to a civil libertarian 
jurisprudence that indicates the decline, if not demise, of Chevron.  But a fair 
reading of the doctrine is not consistent with such sweeping conclusions. 
For Pearlstein, the post-9/11 decisions epitomize the decline of Chevron and 
the ascendancy of the Marbury v. Madison principle “to say what the law is” 
on critical issues of individual liberty and executive power.320  In the major 
 
courts would ‘clean it up.’”) (citing Editorial, Profiles in Cowardice, WASH. POST., Oct. 1, 
2006, at B6). 
314 See generally WITTES, CHESNEY & BENHALIM, supra note 309.  
315 See supra notes 265-66 and accompanying text. 
316 See supra notes 267-70 and accompanying text.  
317 See 8 U.S.C. § 1226a(a)(5) (2006).   
318 In Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705 (2010), the Court, by a six-
to-three vote, upheld the material-support provisions of the PATRIOT Act against an as-
applied constitutional challenge.  This ruling may suggest that, where Congress legislates 
with clarity on national security issues – even in the sensitive area of speech – the Court 
may be more likely to defer.  See generally Peter Margulies, Advising Terrorism: Material 
Support, Safe Harbors, and Freedom of Speech, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 445 (2012). 
319 See supra notes 9-11 and accompanying text. 
320 Pearlstein, supra note 9, at 784-86, 822-23. 
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post-9/11 Supreme Court decisions, “the Court has swept aside vigorous 
arguments by the executive that it refrain from engagement . . . .  Moreover, 
the Court has scarcely noted any doctrinal tradition of interpretive ‘deference’ 
on the meaning of the laws.”321  Hence, for Pearlstein, “on descriptive and 
normative grounds, the events of the past decade have called the prevailing 
account [of foreign affairs exceptionalism] into question.”322  Other civil 
libertarian scholars have echoed this view.323  Martin Flaherty argues that “in 
every major case arising out of 9/11, the Court has rejected the position staked 
out by the executive branch, even when supported by Congress.”324  As he sees 
it, the Supreme Court “reclaim[ed] its primacy in legal interpretation” in the 
post-9/11 decisions, which “represent a stunning reassertion of the judiciary’s 
proper role in foreign relations.”325 
While the post-9/11 decisions do assert some role for courts in deciding 
national security cases, Chevron-detractors overstate the case for civil 
libertarianism.  Hamdi and Boumediene are, in some respects, civil libertarian 
rulings, for in both cases the Court rejected the premise that the Executive 
possessed unlimited powers to detain indefinitely enemy combatants.  But the 
cases provide very little content regarding the scope of individual rights, 
leading many civil libertarian theorists to critique the decisions as devoid of 
substantive content or clarity.326  Moreover, Hamdi provides Chevron-style 
support for the President’s interpretation of the AUMF, at least insofar as the 
detention of battlefield captures is concerned.327  The Court had other, firmer 
civil libertarian bases upon which to decide that case, not least Justice Scalia’s 
 
321 Id. at 785-86; see also id. at 785 (“[E]vents of the past decade have called the 
prevailing account into question. . . .  [I]n a series of decisions involving national security, 
the Court has been anything but deferential to the executive’s interpretation of the relevant 
statute or treaty.”). 
322 Id. at 785. 
323 See, e.g., Flaherty, supra note 9, at 122 (“At critical points, moreover, each of these 
rejections involved the Court reclaiming its primacy in legal interpretation, an area in which 
advocates of judicial deference have appeared to make substantial progress.  The Court 
nonetheless rejected deference in statutory construction in Rasul v. Bush.  It took the same 
tack with regard to treaties in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld.  It further rejected deference in 
constitutional interpretation in both Hamdi v. Rumsfeld and Boumediene v. Bush.” (footnotes 
omitted)).  
324 Id. 
325 Id. 
326 See Martinez, supra note 11, at 1014-15 (“Why is it that litigation concerning the 
alleged enemy combatants detained at Guantanamo and elsewhere has been going on for 
more than six years and almost nothing seems to have actually been decided?”); David Cole, 
After September 11: What We Still Don’t Know, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Sept. 29, 2011, at 27, 28 
(“The Court’s [post-9/11] decisions were in truth quite limited.  Two decisions addressed 
only whether Guantánamo detainees could be heard in court, but said nothing about the law 
that would apply once their claims were adjudicated.”).   
327 See supra notes 232-36 and accompanying text.   
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dissenting opinion that Hamdi, a citizen, deserved all of the protections of 
criminal procedure.328  Instead, the Court took a middle-ground approach, 
siding largely with the Bush Administration regarding its power to detain, at 
least in that case.  Both the plurality and Justice Souter’s partial concurrence 
and dissent – six Justices in all – agreed Congress could delegate such 
detention powers to the President, rejecting Justice Scalia’s civil-libertarian 
claim that the government was required to charge Hamdi with a crime or 
release him.329  Hence, the decisions are hardly major victories for advocates 
of civil libertarianism.330  
Deborah Pearlstein argues further that the Supreme Court’s recent national 
security and domestic decisions evidence Chevron’s “less-than-transformative 
impact” on decisionmaking331 and lack of “doctrinal stability.”332  Citing recent 
empirical scholarship assessing judicial citations to Chevron across a range of 
fields,333 Pearlstein claims that “Chevron has exerted anything but a defining 
hold on Supreme Court treatment of agency interpretation of federal laws”334 
and that the academic enthusiasm for Chevron is simply out of step with 
broader doctrinal trends within administrative law.  As she explains: 
It is perhaps more than a little ironic that Chevron has gained interest 
from foreign relations scholars at the same time that scholars of 
administrative law have been demonstrating with increasing 
persuasiveness how limited the impact of Chevron has been in cases 
reviewing agency statutory interpretation. . . .  Indeed, to the extent it is 
possible to tell a unified, qualitative story about the trajectory of the 
Court’s major administrative law cases since 1984, it is mostly a story 
that sees the Court narrowing the range of agency decisions to which 
Chevron might apply and insisting upon the significant interpretive power 
the Court retains even within the Chevron regime.  More, it shows a 
Court chafing against the sometimes awkward limits Chevron seems to 
 
328 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 573-75 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also 
supra note 240 and accompanying text. 
329 See Sunstein, supra note 1, at 2670 (“The Hamdi plurality . . . did not question Justice 
Souter’s claim that a clear statement was required.  It concluded instead that the AUMF 
provided that statement, because the detention of ‘enemy combatants,’ at least for the 
duration of the conflict in which the capture occurred, ‘is so fundamental and accepted an 
incident to war as to be an exercise of the “necessary and appropriate force” Congress has 
authorized the President to use.’” (quoting Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 518 (plurality opinion))).   
330 See Martinez, supra note 11, at 1092 (arguing that the pre-Boumediene decisions 
“resulted in a great deal of process, and not much justice”). 
331 Pearlstein, supra note 9, at 811.   
332 See id. at 809; id. at 787 (“Chevron is not nearly as doctrinally stable as its advocates 
suggest.”).   
333 See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of 
Deference: Supreme Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to 
Hamdan, 96 GEO. L.J. 1083 (2008). 
334 Pearlstein, supra note 9, at 787.   
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impose on why executive views might matter and when they may be 
taken into interpretive account.335 
Pearlstein’s belief in the diminishing importance of Chevron in the domestic 
context leads her to conclude that Chevron “seems a less than ideal candidate 
for resolving how the courts and the executive should share interpretive power 
in the law of foreign relations.”336 
There is an interesting symmetry between the descriptive accounts by 
Chevron-detractors, who cast the post-9/11 decisions as non-deferential, and 
Chevron-backers, who take the contrary view.  For, despite their differences, 
both camps rely on the premise that the post-9/11 cases reflect a doctrinal 
break from a more deferential past, an argument that not only misconstrues the 
importance of congressional delegations in prior national security cases but 
disregards Youngstown’s continued centrality in the post-9/11 decisions.  To 
the extent that recent cases reflect a change from the past, the shift is reflected 
in the greater clarity with which the Court has promoted joint political branch 
decisionmaking as a predicate for deference.  That norm, couched as it is in the 
requirement of congressional delegations, is reflected in the recent non-
emergency cases of administrative law as well.337 
D. Chevron, Youngstown, and Congressional Delegation 
Surely one of the advantages of the Chevron doctrine is that it appears to 
replace Youngstown, which scholars have found to be an imprecise and 
malleable framework,338 with a simpler and cleaner two-step process in which 
courts either follow clear statutory language or, in ambiguous cases, defer to 
reasonable presidential action.339  But the effort by Chevron-backers to expand 
the doctrine has placed the case on a collision course with its underlying 
delegation-based foundation in a way that undermines a series of post-Chevron 
cases in the domestic context.340   
Those who back Chevron in national security argue that legislative silence is 
mere “ambiguity” that should “count as [an] implicit delegation[]”341 in a 
 
335 Id. at 810-11.   
336 Id. at 810. 
337 See supra Part I.C. 
338 See, e.g., Katyal, supra note 32, at 99 (observing how the “all-things-to-all-people 
quality” of Justice Jackson’s concurrence “can provide arguments favoring any branch of 
government under many circumstances”); Martinez, supra note 11, at 1076 (“[W]hen a 
court wants to uphold the substance of government action, it does so by pushing the case 
into Youngstown categories one or two (finding congressional authorization), and when it 
wants to strike an action down, it pushes the case into category three.”); cf. Bellia, supra 
note 20, at 94 (“[T]he language in the [Youngstown] concurrences is sufficiently open-ended 
to support a number of different outcomes in any given case.”). 
339 See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984).   
340 See supra Part I.C.   
341 Sunstein, supra note 1, at 2666-67.   
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court’s “attempted reconstruction of congressional will.”342  In making this 
claim, Chevron-backers repackage cases of congressional silence, which 
belong in Jackson’s Category Two – the “zone of twilight” – into a 
consolidated super-Category One.  Their expanded Category One includes 
executive decisionmaking based on legislative authorization as well as 
circumstances in which the legislature remains silent.  While such efforts to 
reconstruct legislative intent may be possible where delegations are apparent, 
the argument goes too far when it effectively becomes a substitute for the 
legislative process.  Put differently, leaving it to the Executive to craft the 
policies of its choosing without legislative parameters simply cannot be 
squared with even a generous reading of Chevron, a point that is reinforced by 
recent cases in the domestic context.  In the case of legislative silence, and in 
the absence of a theory of plenary Executive Branch powers where national 
security is concerned,343 Chevron cannot fill the gap.  This explains why the 
Court, finding itself within the “zone of twilight,” often remanded questions to 
Congress for legislative clarification as opposed to following the approach 
called for by Chevron-backers. 
For Jackson, presidential action taken in the context of vague legislation 
should be analyzed through the prism of Category Two, leaving the policy 
susceptible, at least potentially, to judicial invalidation.  To the extent that 
Chevron-backers overstate the role of the Executive’s institutional competence 
and understate the role of congressional delegations, they stretch Chevron 
beyond the appropriate boundaries that courts have established in the domestic 
context.344  Their reading of the doctrine would eliminate Youngstown’s “zone 
of twilight,” effectively replacing Justice Jackson’s three categories with only 
two, obscuring – indeed, erasing – a critical analysis about legislative silence 
that is critical to the Chevron Step Zero inquiry. 
The distinction between legislative ambiguity and legislative silence may at 
times be hard to define, but this difference remains important, as it informs 
much of the debate about Chevron Step Zero and Jackson’s Youngstown’s 
Category Two.  Simply calling for especially “generous” statutory 
constructions because national security is concerned finesses the question in 
ways that are neither doctrinally accurate nor normatively appealing.  Sunstein 
argues, for example:  
Insofar as the AUMF is applied in a context that involves the 
constitutional powers of the President, it should be interpreted 
generously.  In this domain, the President receives the kind of super-
 
342 Id. at 2667.   
343 See, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 516-17 (2004) (plurality opinion) 
(refusing to endorse the government’s claim “that no explicit congressional authorization 
[for detention] is required, because the Executive possesses plenary authority to detain 
pursuant to Article II of the Constitution”).   
344 See supra Part I.C.   
  
2012] CHEVRON MEETS YOUNGSTOWN 1971 
 
strong deference that derives from the combination of Chevron with what 
are plausibly taken to be his constitutional responsibilities.345 
But where those constitutional powers are themselves a gray area,346 it is 
improper to claim that Chevron – a case about statutory interpretation – can 
serve as a one-way ratchet for Executive deference simply because the Court 
finds itself interpreting presidential decisions falling within the national 
security domain.  The post-9/11 decisions resist that idea by requiring 
Congress to engage the legislative process, producing, if not a conversation 
between the President and Congress, “a dialogue between Congress and the 
Court.”347 
While Chevron-backers tend to use administrative law deference norms to 
collapse the government’s shared national security powers into a single branch, 
Chevron-detractors overstate the appropriate judicial response to national 
security crises, both descriptively and normatively.348  Chevron’s detractors, 
for their part, push zone-of-twilight cases into a super Category Three, in 
which executive power is at its lowest ebb and where courts would accord no 
deference to the Executive.  While it may be true to some degree that “the 
Court’s recent foreign relations cases challenge traditional accounts of judicial 
deference,”349 the notion that 9/11 changed everything overstates the extent of 
judicial activism during the past decade.  The decisions between Rasul and 
Boumediene, rather than reflecting a newfound assertion of judicial power, 
demonstrate continuity with recent domestic law interpretations of Chevron by 
deferring to policies that are the result of joint political branch decisionmaking 
while treating more skeptically policies that lack a statutory foundation.  By 
relying on the Youngstown framework, the Court’s post-9/11 decisions have 
engaged a process-oriented methodology that avoids the polls of executive 
unilateralism and civil libertarianism.350   
E. Chevron, Executive Unilateralism, and Civil Libertarianism 
Although certain Chevron-backers in theory call for a statutory, not 
constitutional, solution to national security problems, they advocate deference 
even when “there is no interpretation of a statutory term[,] but simply a policy 
judgment by the executive.”351  This expansive theory of Chevron not only 
 
345 Sunstein, supra note 1, at 2671; see also Bradley, supra note 1, at 673.   
346 See, e.g., supra note 343.   
347 Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 738 (2008). 
348 See supra notes 320-30 and accompanying text. 
349 Pearlstein, supra note 9, at 809.   
350 See generally Issacharoff & Pildes, supra note 30. 
351 Posner & Sunstein, supra note 1, at 1199.  While Curtis Bradley argues that the 
concern of an overly deferential Chevron doctrine has “less force in the context of foreign 
affairs law – an area characterized long before Chevron by exceedingly broad executive 
branch power and sweeping deference by the courts,” Bradley, supra note 1, at 673, this 
argument, too, relies on certain premises about national security doctrine that are called into 
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rests on a dubious doctrinal foundation352 but is at times virtually 
indistinguishable from a theory of unilateral executive power that disregards 
entirely Youngstown’s centrality to national security law.  As Chevron-backers 
such as Posner and Sunstein explain, “in the domain of foreign relations, the 
approach signaled in Chevron should apply even if the executive is not 
exercising delegated authority to make rules or conduct adjudications,” a point 
that is strengthened by “considerations of constitutional structure [that] argue 
strongly in favor of deference to the executive”353 and that “makes the 
argument for deference stronger than in Chevron itself.”354  By advocating a 
vast policy space for the Executive that supplants congressional legislation 
whenever statutory authority is absent, their argument comes closer to the 
brand of pure and unalloyed executive unilateralism that the Court has rejected 
throughout the post-9/11 decisions.355  Their enthusiasm for single-branch 
approaches causes them to espouse a theory outside the mainstream 
understanding of Chevron that undermines the “realistic and middle-ground 
alternative” that an administrative law approach can bring to the polarized 
debate between executive unilateralists and civil libertarians.356 
Perhaps it should not be surprising, then, that some Chevron-backers also 
support broader theories of executive unilateralism.  For example, John Yoo, 
who has argued for a model of foreign affairs law based on executive 
unilateralism,357 also makes the case for Chevron deference in national security 
 
question not only in the post-9/11 context, but in seminal doctrines such as Youngstown.   
352 See supra Part I.C.  
353 Posner & Sunstein, supra note 1, at 1205.   
354 Id.   
355 Executive unilateralism is a theory about the President’s constitutional powers based 
upon constitutional interpretation and the relative institutional competencies of the three 
branches.  Adherents of this view maintain that judicial review should, at most, determine 
whether the appropriate decisionmaker (namely, the Executive) took appropriate action.  
Assuming that the answer to that question is yes, no further review by a court would be 
necessary.  See, e.g., Robert J. Delahunty & John C. Yoo, The President’s Constitutional 
Authority to Conduct Military Operations Against Terrorist Organizations and the Nations 
That Harbor or Support Them, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 487, 488 (2002) (“We conclude 
that the Constitution vests the President with the plenary authority, as Commander in Chief 
and the sole organ of the nation in its foreign relations, to use military force abroad, 
especially in response to grave national emergencies created by sudden, unforeseen attacks 
on the people and territory of the United States.”).  Its adherents argue that the Executive 
Branch, rather than courts, has unique institutional advantages when responding to national 
security emergencies that the more deliberative legislative and judicial branches lack.   
356 Bradley, supra note 1, at 674 (presenting a Chevron-based theory as a middle ground 
position between the polls of civil libertarianism, which takes a “Marbury perspective,” and 
executive unilateralism, which seeks “blanket judicial deference”). 
357 See JOHN YOO, THE POWERS OF WAR AND PEACE: THE CONSTITUTION AND FOREIGN 
AFFAIRS AFTER 9/11 (2005).  Proponents of executive unilateralism have critiqued the 
Supreme Court’s post-9/11 decisions for their lack of deference as well.  For example, Yoo 
critiques Boumediene as an exercise of “judicial imperialism of the highest order.”  John 
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jurisprudence.358  While Chevron-backers often resist the comparison of their 
administrative law theory of national security jurisprudence with executive 
unilateralism,359 the lack of any strict delegation requirement, and the 
replacement of that requirement with strong deference to the Executive on 
functionalist grounds, begs the question Chevron was meant to solve in the 
first place through legislative delegations.  Hence, it seems entirely reasonable 
to draw parallels between the advocacy of Chevron, at least in its most extreme 
articulation, with an argument favoring the consolidation of all national 
security powers into a single branch. 
The risks are especially apparent when Chevron-backers push their 
argument for broad deference from the realm of statutory ambiguity – where 
there is at least plausible (if contested) justification for agency or presidential 
self-expansion – to cases of legislative silence.  Although Chevron-backers 
argue that “[t]he executive is in the best position to reconcile the competing 
interests at stake, and in the face of statutory silence or ambiguity, Congress 
should therefore be presumed to have delegated interpretive power to the 
executive,”360 this purely functional understanding of Chevron disregards its 
formal foundation.  Given Congress’s apparent disinterest in authorizing, much 
less reversing, executive national security policy through legislation since 
9/11,361 the Chevron-in-national-security argument, as a practical matter, 
collapses into a theory of single-branch governance. 
These problems would be severely lessened if Chevron-backers grounded 
their view of deference in arguments about legislative supremacy, or if they 
highlighted the importance of procedural formalities (such as notice-and-
comment rulemaking or formal adjudications) that administrative law doctrine 
takes as an indication of such a delegation.362  But to the extent that Chevron-
backers countenance single-branch decisionmaking, it is hard to square their 
view either with the underlying delegation requirement of administrative law 
 
Yoo, The Supreme Court Goes to War, WALL ST. J., June 17, 2008, at A23. 
358 See Ku & Yoo, supra note 1.   
359 Cass Sunstein points out he is “not assuming that the President has clear 
constitutional power to do as he proposes.  Under that assumption, the AUMF would be 
irrelevant.  The question here is how the AUMF should be construed when there is a 
plausible claim – not a holding – that the President has the constitutional power to act.”  
Sunstein, supra note 1, at 2671 n.67.   
360 Posner & Sunstein, supra note 1, at 1204 (emphasis added).   
361 See, e.g., Daniel Abebe & Eric A. Posner, The Flaws of Foreign Affairs Legalism, 51 
VA. J. INT’L L. 507, 526-27 (2011) (observing “Congress’s acquiescence in the growth of 
executive power [and] general refusal to counter executive aggrandizement”); Levinson & 
Pildes, supra note 215, at 2352 (“[T]he most glaring institutional fact about the war on 
terror so far is how little Congress has participated in it.  The President has resolved most of 
the novel policy and institutional challenges terrorism poses with virtually no input or 
oversight from the legislative branch.”).   
362 See supra notes 130-38 and accompanying text.   
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or with the Supreme Court’s interpretations of Chevron in the domestic 
context. 
The Court’s invocation of Youngstown has often resulted in seemingly non-
deferential rulings.  This is because “the Youngstown framework assumes that 
Congress will be actively involved in making the difficult policy decisions 
required during wartime and will provide the oversight of Executive-initiated 
action that courts feel ill-suited to offer through first-order rights 
adjudication.”363  But the opinions have been geared less toward restraining the 
Executive or vindicating certain conceptions of civil liberties, and more toward 
revitalizing Congress and involving the courts in the process of restoring that 
institutional balance.  Once the post-9/11 decisions are understood to require 
congressional delegations to authorize executive action, it is hard to see the 
rulings as either purely deferential or non-deferential.  Rather, the cases reflect 
a more practical inquiry that recalls “the imperatives of events and 
contemporary imponderables”364 that define Jackson’s “zone of twilight.”365    
Instead of adopting a broad view of civil libertarianism or executive 
unilateralism, Supreme Court majorities of the past decade have engaged in a 
more focused, Youngstown-based inquiry.  This pragmatic approach, which has 
implications for security-related questions beyond the post-9/11 habeas 
decisions addressed in this Article,366 avoids the polls of pure deference or 
complete non-deference.  It shifts the emphasis away from any single branch of 
government toward a collective responsibility of the political branches to 
engage one another on policy, promoting an inquiry that turns less on whether 
the Executive should “win” and more about the terms on which courts 
vindicate executive policies or individual liberties.  By resetting the proper 
institutional balance, Jackson’s framework clarifies the proper scope of judicial 
review during times of emergency, providing an important rule-of-law basis 
for judicial review of national security policy.  
F. Chevron, Youngstown, and the Rule of Law 
One critic of such a rule-of-law framework for national security is Adrian 
Vermeule who, in a recent article, argues that national security cases expose 
 
363 Levinson & Pildes, supra note 215, at 2351.   
364 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952) (Jackson, J., 
concurring).   
365 Id.   
366 See, e.g., Robert Chesney, Military-Intelligence Convergence and the Law of the Title 
10/Title 50 Debate, 5 J. NAT’L SECURITY L. & POL’Y 539, 562-72 (2012) (discussing CIA 
covert activities such as drone strikes, secret detentions, and the use of CIA-trained proxy 
forces).  Notably, the form and content of the inter-branch dialogue could vary based on the 
particular policy issue involved.  See id. at 588-89 (examining certain requirements that 
information be shared with particular congressional committees in the context of various 
CIA covert activities). 
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the lack of any rule-of-law basis to administrative law.367  Vermeule rejects the 
idea that Chevron’s delegation-based foundation can provide a taming 
influence on national security doctrine.  For Vermeule, administrative law has, 
at its core, legal holes that, during times of emergency, inevitably lead to 
judicial abdication.  Some of these holes (which he calls “black holes”) are 
“themselves created by law”368 and exempt executive policy decisions from 
judicial review.369  Other holes (which he calls “grey holes”) include open-
ended standards370 that courts can “dial up” or “dial down” as needed.371  
Vermeule asserts that these holes account for the lack of any “real” judicial 
review of emergency-law questions because they allow courts to dial down 
review entirely, at which point judicial review becomes more apparent than 
real.372  He argues that these holes evidence the impossibility “that executive 
action arising from war or emergency be governed by ‘ordinary’ administrative 
law, as opposed to some extraordinary law applicable during emergencies.”373 
Vermeule highlights Chevron as an example of a gray hole, asserting that 
“the inquiries at Chevron Steps One and Two at least sometimes function as 
adjustable parameters, whose intensity is dialed up or down as perceived 
emergencies come and go.”374  In such cases, “judges purporting to review 
agency action for conformity with statutes adjust the intensity of review 
sharply downwards in times of perceived emergency, creating cases in which 
apparent judicial oversight becomes insubstantial.”375  In this way, “ordinary 
principles of interpretation are bent or mutated in ways that favor upholding 
administrative decisions.  Judicial review on questions of law becomes less and 
less demanding, a process that taken to its limit produces a legal gray hole.  
This process can happen under Chevron, or without Chevron.”376 
 
367 See generally Vermeule, supra note 1. 
368 See also id. at 1102; see id. at 1096 (“Legal black holes arise when statutes or legal 
rules ‘either explicitly exempt[] the executive from the requirements of the rule of law or 
explicitly exclude[] judicial review of executive action.’” (footnotes omitted) (quoting 
DAVID DYZENHAUS, THE CONSTITUTION OF LAW: LEGALITY IN A TIME OF EMERGENCY 3, 42 
(2006))).   
369 Vermeule, supra note 1, at 1096.  For examples of situations in which executive or 
administrative action can be excluded from the reach of the Administrative Procedure Act 
(APA) during times of emergency, see id. at 1107-16.   
370 See id. at 1096 (“Grey holes, which are ‘disguised black holes,’ arise when ‘there are 
some legal constraints on executive action – it is not a lawless void – but the constraints are 
so insubstantial that they pretty well permit government to do as it pleases.’  Grey holes thus 
present ‘the façade or form of the rule of law rather than any substantive protections.’”  
(footnotes omitted) (quoting DYZENHAUS, supra note 368, at 42)).   
371 Vermeule, supra note 1, at 1118. 
372 Id. at 1119. 
373 Id. at 1102.   
374 Id. at 1127.   
375 Id.   
376 Id. at 1130.   
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However, in both the domestic and national security contexts, the Supreme 
Court has resisted any apparent temptation to “dial down” review in the ways 
Vermeule describes.  The Court, by invoking Youngstown, has tamed Chevron 
doctrine from becoming precisely the type of legal hole Vermeule attributes to 
the administrative law response to emergencies.  While Vermeule considers 
only Circuit-level decisions,377 where one finds many examples of broad 
deference to the Executive Branch,378 the Supreme Court cases are not so 
easily ignored.379  Importantly, the decisions between Rasul and Boumediene 
discussed in this Article constitute Supreme Court reversals of Circuit-level 
rulings that might otherwise be used to illustrate the gray holes Vermeule 
attributes to national security jurisprudence.380  While Vermeule is certainly 
correct that Chevron (and other tests of administrative law) can be subject to 
dynamic interpretations across different cases, he rejects any possibility of the 
kind of rule-of-law framework that has taken hold in the post-9/11 context.  
Rather than expose gray holes of administrative law, the post-9/11 decisions 
have invoked Youngstown as a way to bring important structure to national 
security, a field of law that is often bereft of clear procedural and substantive 
guidelines. 
While there is more to be written about the intersection between a properly 
scaled Chevron doctrine and the types of rule-of-law doctrines Vermeule 
 
377 Id. at 1097 (arguing that circuit court rulings are more important than Supreme Court 
law for understanding how the law “actually operates”).   
378 See, e.g., Al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (upholding 
government-friendly procedures in habeas proceedings brought by a Guantánamo detainee), 
cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1814 (2011); Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 605 F.3d 84 (D.C. Cir. 2010) 
(determining that federal courts did not have jurisdiction to consider the petitions for habeas 
corpus brought by detainees at Bagram Air Force Base in Afghanistan); Kiyemba v. Obama, 
561 F.3d 509 (D.C. Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1880 (2010) (holding that district 
courts could not require the government to provide counsel thirty days’ notice prior to 
effecting a detainee’s transfer from Guantánamo where the detainee feared torture); 
Kiyemba v. Obama, 555 F.3d 1022 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (holding that the district court could 
not order detainees to be released into the United States), vacated, 130 S. Ct. 1235 (2010) 
(per curiam), reinstated on remand, 605 F.3d 1046 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (per curiam), cert. 
denied, 131 S.Ct. 1631 (2011). 
379 Cf. Cole, supra note 326, at 27-28 (arguing that while it “would be wrong to say that 
the Supreme Court was the only, or even the principal, checking mechanism” after 9/11, 
“[o]ne of the most important lessons of the past decade may be that the rule of law, 
seemingly so vulnerable in the . . . aftermath [of 9/11], proved far more resilient than many 
would have predicted”); id. (pointing out that the post-9/11 period demonstrates that “the 
values of the rule of law are more tenacious than many cynics and ‘realists’ thought, 
certainly than many in the Bush administration imagined”). 
380 See Boumediene v. Bush, 476 F.3d 981 (D.C. Cir. 2007), rev’d and remanded, 553 
U.S. 723 (2008); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 415 F.3d 33 (D.C. Cir. 2005), rev’d, 548 U.S. 557 
(2006); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450 (4th Cir. 2003), vacated and remanded, 542 U.S. 
507 (2004); Al Odah v. U.S., 321 F.3d 1134 (D.C. Cir. 2003), rev’d and remanded, Rasul v. 
Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004). 
  
2012] CHEVRON MEETS YOUNGSTOWN 1977 
 
rejects in the national security context – a matter for future inquiry – it is 
clearly the case that, during the post-9/11 period, the Supreme Court has kept 
legal holes at bay by requiring the political branches to engage one another 
over critical questions at the intersection of individual liberty and executive 
power.  By emphasizing Youngstown’s prioritization of dual-branch solutions 
to questions of national security, the Supreme Court’s recent national security 
decisions have been catalytic rather than preclusive, promoting clash, 
conversation, and dialogue within the political branches.  Those decisions are 
remarkably consistent with the development of deference doctrines in the 
ordinary administrative law context, pointing to a vital interplay between the 
national security and domestic cases that highlights the vitality of inter-branch 
solutions to questions in both legal domains. 
CONCLUSION 
While the question of the appropriate level of judicial deference to the 
Executive dominates contemporary scholarship about the aftermath of 9/11, 
scholars have yet to consider how the Court’s recent decisions restore 
Youngstown’s delegation requirement to national security law.  The Court’s 
invocation of Youngstown sheds important light on the Chevron debate, which 
remains caught in a polarized clash between those who would expand the case 
beyond recognition and those who would jettison the framework entirely.  The 
Supreme Court’s insistence on meaningful dual-branch solutions to national 
security preserves a mainstream reading of Chevron that keeps the case in line 
with its recent domestic interpretations.  Indeed, Chevron has important 
significance to national security, though not in the way that many of its backers 
have argued.  The Court must guard Chevron’s borders to ensure Congress’s 
meaningful participation in the lawmaking process rather than allow Congress 
to “alter the fundamental details of a regulatory scheme in vague terms or 
ancillary provisions.”381  Doing so upholds critical rule-of-law values within 
the national security domain. 
 
 
381 Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001).   
